| Summary: | The aim of the present paper is to follow the reasons for which Heidegger, in his lectures from 1929/30 The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (world – finitude – solitude) repeats the project of Being and Time of an analysis of the human existence and of a description of his existential crises as central for the possibilities of a historical mobilization of the world now no longer from a simply ontological mood, but rather from a so called factical mood, i.e., a mood that possesses a structural connection with our historical world. From that, the paper analyses the figures of boredom going through the most superficial one to the deep boredom, while also exposing what once more hinders Heidegger’s attempt to think in a consistent way about the fundamental event of singularization as a key path into the temporality of Being as such, which implies a new failure of the project of fundamental ontology in its essential liaison with existential analytics.
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