Ningún hombre es una isla.* Meditación en torno a la (im)posibilidad de la responsabilidad moral
The Strawson’s Basic Argument is the stronger against moral responsibility in Philosophy of action. One should be responsible of his identity to be moral responsible of his actions, but then nobody could be never responsible. In this article I criticize orthodox solutions to Strawson’s sceptical cha...
Main Author: | Vicente Raga Rosaleny |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
Published: |
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
2006-02-01
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Series: | Revista de Filosofia |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/10341 |
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