IMPROVING MARKET ACCESS: THE ROLE OF AUCTIONS IN CONVERTING TARIFF-RATE QUOTAS INTO SINGLE TARIFFS
This paper analyses the conversion of TRQs into single tariffs under perfect and imperfect competition. Based on experiences from Switzerland, auctions allow the determination of the equivalent tariffs. Results from auctions of TRQs of dried meat products under perfect competition show that the obse...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Slovak University of Agriculture
2014-03-01
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| Series: | Review of Agricultural and Applied Economics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://roaae.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/RAAE_1_2014_Joerin.pdf |
| _version_ | 1818988189825630208 |
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| author | Robert Joerin |
| author_facet | Robert Joerin |
| author_sort | Robert Joerin |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper analyses the conversion of TRQs into single tariffs under perfect and imperfect competition. Based on experiences from Switzerland, auctions allow the determination of the equivalent tariffs. Results from auctions of TRQs of dried meat products under perfect competition show that the observed auction prices would lead to tariffs which are below the equivalent tariffs. Hence, if the ‘new tariffs’ would be determined through auctions, market access would be improved, but also farm prices would lower. However, under imperfect competition, based on Bhagwati’s theorem of the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas, market access could be improved by converting TRQs into single tariffs even if farm prices are held constant. In order to ensure that auctions are competitive and collusion among bidders is prevented, the ‘variable supply’ auction format which re¬sists collusion needs to be adopted in the event of high buyer’s concentration. Despite the various benefits of auctions, quota holders’ persisting rent-seeking behaviour hinders that auctions are mainstreamed in allocating TRQs. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-20T19:18:38Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-bee431d02396460096b76b24e92bf8f7 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1336-9261 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-20T19:18:38Z |
| publishDate | 2014-03-01 |
| publisher | Slovak University of Agriculture |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Review of Agricultural and Applied Economics |
| spelling | doaj.art-bee431d02396460096b76b24e92bf8f72022-12-21T19:29:03ZengSlovak University of AgricultureReview of Agricultural and Applied Economics1336-92612014-03-01171243010.15414/raae.2014.17.01.24-30375-1IMPROVING MARKET ACCESS: THE ROLE OF AUCTIONS IN CONVERTING TARIFF-RATE QUOTAS INTO SINGLE TARIFFSRobert JoerinThis paper analyses the conversion of TRQs into single tariffs under perfect and imperfect competition. Based on experiences from Switzerland, auctions allow the determination of the equivalent tariffs. Results from auctions of TRQs of dried meat products under perfect competition show that the observed auction prices would lead to tariffs which are below the equivalent tariffs. Hence, if the ‘new tariffs’ would be determined through auctions, market access would be improved, but also farm prices would lower. However, under imperfect competition, based on Bhagwati’s theorem of the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas, market access could be improved by converting TRQs into single tariffs even if farm prices are held constant. In order to ensure that auctions are competitive and collusion among bidders is prevented, the ‘variable supply’ auction format which re¬sists collusion needs to be adopted in the event of high buyer’s concentration. Despite the various benefits of auctions, quota holders’ persisting rent-seeking behaviour hinders that auctions are mainstreamed in allocating TRQs.http://roaae.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/RAAE_1_2014_Joerin.pdftariff-rate quotasimperfect competitionauctionsWTO |
| spellingShingle | Robert Joerin IMPROVING MARKET ACCESS: THE ROLE OF AUCTIONS IN CONVERTING TARIFF-RATE QUOTAS INTO SINGLE TARIFFS Review of Agricultural and Applied Economics tariff-rate quotas imperfect competition auctions WTO |
| title | IMPROVING MARKET ACCESS: THE ROLE OF AUCTIONS IN CONVERTING TARIFF-RATE QUOTAS INTO SINGLE TARIFFS |
| title_full | IMPROVING MARKET ACCESS: THE ROLE OF AUCTIONS IN CONVERTING TARIFF-RATE QUOTAS INTO SINGLE TARIFFS |
| title_fullStr | IMPROVING MARKET ACCESS: THE ROLE OF AUCTIONS IN CONVERTING TARIFF-RATE QUOTAS INTO SINGLE TARIFFS |
| title_full_unstemmed | IMPROVING MARKET ACCESS: THE ROLE OF AUCTIONS IN CONVERTING TARIFF-RATE QUOTAS INTO SINGLE TARIFFS |
| title_short | IMPROVING MARKET ACCESS: THE ROLE OF AUCTIONS IN CONVERTING TARIFF-RATE QUOTAS INTO SINGLE TARIFFS |
| title_sort | improving market access the role of auctions in converting tariff rate quotas into single tariffs |
| topic | tariff-rate quotas imperfect competition auctions WTO |
| url | http://roaae.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/RAAE_1_2014_Joerin.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT robertjoerin improvingmarketaccesstheroleofauctionsinconvertingtariffratequotasintosingletariffs |