Decisions of competing supply chain with altruistic retailer under risk aversion
This paper considers the supply chain composed of altruistic retailers and selfish manufacturers under risk aversion. We use the mean variance (MV) method to construct two types of behavior models. One is a two-stage supply chain model with a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and the other...
Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Sciendo
2023-07-01
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Series: | Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences |
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Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2021.2.00301 |
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author | Liu Jing Wu Yi Huang Fuyou Ma Chao |
author_facet | Liu Jing Wu Yi Huang Fuyou Ma Chao |
author_sort | Liu Jing |
collection | DOAJ |
description | This paper considers the supply chain composed of altruistic retailers and selfish manufacturers under risk aversion. We use the mean variance (MV) method to construct two types of behavior models. One is a two-stage supply chain model with a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and the other is a competitive supply chain model with two retailers and two manufacturers. We discuss the decision-making problems under manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) game and retailer Stackelberg (RS) game, respectively. We analyze the role of risk aversion and power structure. Results show that the more risk aversion manufacturers are, the lower the emission reduction levels are. It also find that the prices increase with power shift from retailers to manufacturers. Finally, we point out that the competing can help the firms earn more benefits via numerical studies. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-07T16:20:04Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-bf08fda7f5654814b2862d14fb6e15c2 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2444-8656 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-04-25T00:56:26Z |
publishDate | 2023-07-01 |
publisher | Sciendo |
record_format | Article |
series | Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences |
spelling | doaj.art-bf08fda7f5654814b2862d14fb6e15c22024-03-11T10:05:45ZengSciendoApplied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences2444-86562023-07-018249951210.2478/amns.2021.2.00301Decisions of competing supply chain with altruistic retailer under risk aversionLiu Jing0Wu Yi1Huang Fuyou2Ma Chao31Hubei Key Laboratory of Power System Design and Test for Electrical Vehicle, Hubei University of Arts and Science, Xiangyang, 441053, China2School of Automobile and Traffic Engineering, Hubei University of Arts and Sciences, Xiangyang441053, China3Institute of Transportation Development Strategy & Planning of Sichuan Province, Chengdu610041, China1Hubei Key Laboratory of Power System Design and Test for Electrical Vehicle, Hubei University of Arts and Science, Xiangyang, 441053, ChinaThis paper considers the supply chain composed of altruistic retailers and selfish manufacturers under risk aversion. We use the mean variance (MV) method to construct two types of behavior models. One is a two-stage supply chain model with a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and the other is a competitive supply chain model with two retailers and two manufacturers. We discuss the decision-making problems under manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) game and retailer Stackelberg (RS) game, respectively. We analyze the role of risk aversion and power structure. Results show that the more risk aversion manufacturers are, the lower the emission reduction levels are. It also find that the prices increase with power shift from retailers to manufacturers. Finally, we point out that the competing can help the firms earn more benefits via numerical studies.https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2021.2.00301competing supply chainaltruistic preferencestackelberg gamerisk aversion90b50 |
spellingShingle | Liu Jing Wu Yi Huang Fuyou Ma Chao Decisions of competing supply chain with altruistic retailer under risk aversion Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences competing supply chain altruistic preference stackelberg game risk aversion 90b50 |
title | Decisions of competing supply chain with altruistic retailer under risk aversion |
title_full | Decisions of competing supply chain with altruistic retailer under risk aversion |
title_fullStr | Decisions of competing supply chain with altruistic retailer under risk aversion |
title_full_unstemmed | Decisions of competing supply chain with altruistic retailer under risk aversion |
title_short | Decisions of competing supply chain with altruistic retailer under risk aversion |
title_sort | decisions of competing supply chain with altruistic retailer under risk aversion |
topic | competing supply chain altruistic preference stackelberg game risk aversion 90b50 |
url | https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2021.2.00301 |
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