Artificial Forms of Life

The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as <i>‘strong’ AI</i> is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, whi...

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Main Author: Sebastian Sunday Grève
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2023-09-01
Series:Philosophies
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/8/5/89
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author Sebastian Sunday Grève
author_facet Sebastian Sunday Grève
author_sort Sebastian Sunday Grève
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description The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as <i>‘strong’ AI</i> is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit if we recast it (in terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it) as the question of whether an unnatural form of nature is possible. The present paper seeks to explain this paradoxical kind of possibility by arguing that machines can share the human form of life and thus acquire human mindedness, which is to say they can be intelligent, conscious, sentient, etc. in precisely the way that a human being typically is.
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spelling doaj.art-bf0aa5c2ecdd49ba8719c98b1fd211062024-04-03T05:26:58ZengMDPI AGPhilosophies2409-92872023-09-01858910.3390/philosophies8050089Artificial Forms of LifeSebastian Sunday Grève0Chinese Institute of Foreign Philosophy, Beijing 100871, ChinaThe logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as <i>‘strong’ AI</i> is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit if we recast it (in terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it) as the question of whether an unnatural form of nature is possible. The present paper seeks to explain this paradoxical kind of possibility by arguing that machines can share the human form of life and thus acquire human mindedness, which is to say they can be intelligent, conscious, sentient, etc. in precisely the way that a human being typically is.https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/8/5/89artificial intelligenceartificial general intelligencehuman–machine interactionmachine consciousnessTuring testChinese room
spellingShingle Sebastian Sunday Grève
Artificial Forms of Life
Philosophies
artificial intelligence
artificial general intelligence
human–machine interaction
machine consciousness
Turing test
Chinese room
title Artificial Forms of Life
title_full Artificial Forms of Life
title_fullStr Artificial Forms of Life
title_full_unstemmed Artificial Forms of Life
title_short Artificial Forms of Life
title_sort artificial forms of life
topic artificial intelligence
artificial general intelligence
human–machine interaction
machine consciousness
Turing test
Chinese room
url https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/8/5/89
work_keys_str_mv AT sebastiansundaygreve artificialformsoflife