Artificial Forms of Life
The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as <i>‘strong’ AI</i> is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, whi...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2023-09-01
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Series: | Philosophies |
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Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/8/5/89 |
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author | Sebastian Sunday Grève |
author_facet | Sebastian Sunday Grève |
author_sort | Sebastian Sunday Grève |
collection | DOAJ |
description | The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as <i>‘strong’ AI</i> is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit if we recast it (in terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it) as the question of whether an unnatural form of nature is possible. The present paper seeks to explain this paradoxical kind of possibility by arguing that machines can share the human form of life and thus acquire human mindedness, which is to say they can be intelligent, conscious, sentient, etc. in precisely the way that a human being typically is. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-10T20:57:58Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-bf0aa5c2ecdd49ba8719c98b1fd21106 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2409-9287 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-04-24T14:25:01Z |
publishDate | 2023-09-01 |
publisher | MDPI AG |
record_format | Article |
series | Philosophies |
spelling | doaj.art-bf0aa5c2ecdd49ba8719c98b1fd211062024-04-03T05:26:58ZengMDPI AGPhilosophies2409-92872023-09-01858910.3390/philosophies8050089Artificial Forms of LifeSebastian Sunday Grève0Chinese Institute of Foreign Philosophy, Beijing 100871, ChinaThe logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as <i>‘strong’ AI</i> is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit if we recast it (in terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it) as the question of whether an unnatural form of nature is possible. The present paper seeks to explain this paradoxical kind of possibility by arguing that machines can share the human form of life and thus acquire human mindedness, which is to say they can be intelligent, conscious, sentient, etc. in precisely the way that a human being typically is.https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/8/5/89artificial intelligenceartificial general intelligencehuman–machine interactionmachine consciousnessTuring testChinese room |
spellingShingle | Sebastian Sunday Grève Artificial Forms of Life Philosophies artificial intelligence artificial general intelligence human–machine interaction machine consciousness Turing test Chinese room |
title | Artificial Forms of Life |
title_full | Artificial Forms of Life |
title_fullStr | Artificial Forms of Life |
title_full_unstemmed | Artificial Forms of Life |
title_short | Artificial Forms of Life |
title_sort | artificial forms of life |
topic | artificial intelligence artificial general intelligence human–machine interaction machine consciousness Turing test Chinese room |
url | https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/8/5/89 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT sebastiansundaygreve artificialformsoflife |