Dynamic Evolutionary Game Approach for Blockchain-Driven Incentive and Restraint Mechanism in Supply Chain Financing

The sustainability of financing is an important measure in the development of supply chains. However, the difficulty and high cost of financing have always been critical factors hindering the sustainable development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Blockchain technology (BT) is an effec...

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Main Authors: Limin Su, Yongchao Cao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2023-08-01
Series:Systems
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/11/8/406
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author Limin Su
Yongchao Cao
author_facet Limin Su
Yongchao Cao
author_sort Limin Su
collection DOAJ
description The sustainability of financing is an important measure in the development of supply chains. However, the difficulty and high cost of financing have always been critical factors hindering the sustainable development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Blockchain technology (BT) is an effective tool to relieve the current problem. Based on it, this study aims to establish Blockchain-driven incentives and restraint mechanisms for SME financing using a dynamic game model in which financial institutions (FIs) and new agricultural business entities (NABEs) are regarded as game subjects. By analyzing the impact of key parameters on the equilibrium state of the game for all stakeholders, several findings are drawn as follows. (1) The usage of BT affects FI loan strategies by influencing their cost in supply chain financing. (2) The usage of BT affects NABE’s strategy choice by influencing their loan interest rate. (3) The usage of BT affects NABE’s strategy choice by influencing their default losses. (4) The usage of BT affects NABE’s and FI’s strategy choices by influencing their additional benefits. This study provides decision-making support for optimal strategy decisions under different conditions and serves as a theoretical reference for the government in formulating financing incentive and restraint mechanisms.
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spelling doaj.art-bf63a3f8de0f45d9b4430db8c4ac76b22023-11-19T03:12:44ZengMDPI AGSystems2079-89542023-08-0111840610.3390/systems11080406Dynamic Evolutionary Game Approach for Blockchain-Driven Incentive and Restraint Mechanism in Supply Chain FinancingLimin Su0Yongchao Cao1School of Mathematics and Statistics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, ChinaSchool of Management and Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, ChinaThe sustainability of financing is an important measure in the development of supply chains. However, the difficulty and high cost of financing have always been critical factors hindering the sustainable development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Blockchain technology (BT) is an effective tool to relieve the current problem. Based on it, this study aims to establish Blockchain-driven incentives and restraint mechanisms for SME financing using a dynamic game model in which financial institutions (FIs) and new agricultural business entities (NABEs) are regarded as game subjects. By analyzing the impact of key parameters on the equilibrium state of the game for all stakeholders, several findings are drawn as follows. (1) The usage of BT affects FI loan strategies by influencing their cost in supply chain financing. (2) The usage of BT affects NABE’s strategy choice by influencing their loan interest rate. (3) The usage of BT affects NABE’s strategy choice by influencing their default losses. (4) The usage of BT affects NABE’s and FI’s strategy choices by influencing their additional benefits. This study provides decision-making support for optimal strategy decisions under different conditions and serves as a theoretical reference for the government in formulating financing incentive and restraint mechanisms.https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/11/8/406supply chain financingoptimal strategy decisionBlockchain technologyevolutionary game modelincentive mechanismnew agricultural business entities
spellingShingle Limin Su
Yongchao Cao
Dynamic Evolutionary Game Approach for Blockchain-Driven Incentive and Restraint Mechanism in Supply Chain Financing
Systems
supply chain financing
optimal strategy decision
Blockchain technology
evolutionary game model
incentive mechanism
new agricultural business entities
title Dynamic Evolutionary Game Approach for Blockchain-Driven Incentive and Restraint Mechanism in Supply Chain Financing
title_full Dynamic Evolutionary Game Approach for Blockchain-Driven Incentive and Restraint Mechanism in Supply Chain Financing
title_fullStr Dynamic Evolutionary Game Approach for Blockchain-Driven Incentive and Restraint Mechanism in Supply Chain Financing
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic Evolutionary Game Approach for Blockchain-Driven Incentive and Restraint Mechanism in Supply Chain Financing
title_short Dynamic Evolutionary Game Approach for Blockchain-Driven Incentive and Restraint Mechanism in Supply Chain Financing
title_sort dynamic evolutionary game approach for blockchain driven incentive and restraint mechanism in supply chain financing
topic supply chain financing
optimal strategy decision
Blockchain technology
evolutionary game model
incentive mechanism
new agricultural business entities
url https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/11/8/406
work_keys_str_mv AT liminsu dynamicevolutionarygameapproachforblockchaindrivenincentiveandrestraintmechanisminsupplychainfinancing
AT yongchaocao dynamicevolutionarygameapproachforblockchaindrivenincentiveandrestraintmechanisminsupplychainfinancing