The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types

Economic games involving allocation of resources have been a useful tool for the study of decision making for both psychologists and economists. In two experiments involving a repeated-trials game over twenty opportunities, undergraduates made choices to distribute resources between themselves and a...

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Main Authors: Arthur Kennelly, Edmund Fantino
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 2007-06-01
Series:Judgment and Decision Making
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500000851/type/journal_article
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author Arthur Kennelly
Edmund Fantino
author_facet Arthur Kennelly
Edmund Fantino
author_sort Arthur Kennelly
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description Economic games involving allocation of resources have been a useful tool for the study of decision making for both psychologists and economists. In two experiments involving a repeated-trials game over twenty opportunities, undergraduates made choices to distribute resources between themselves and an unseen, passive other either optimally (for themselves) but non-competitively, equally but non-optimally, or least optimally but competitively. Surprisingly, whether participants were told that the anonymous other was another student or a computer did not matter. Using such terms as “game” and “player” in the course of the session was associated with an increased frequency of competitive behavior. Males were more optimal than females: a gender-by-incentive interaction was found in the first experiment. In agreement with prior research, participants whose resources were backed by monetary incentive acted the most optimally. Overall, equality was the modal strategy employed, although it is clear that motivational context affects the allocation of resources.
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spelling doaj.art-c0671a79617c47edae580fe872febd3a2023-09-03T09:45:59ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752007-06-01220421610.1017/S1930297500000851The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient typesArthur Kennelly0Edmund Fantino1University of California, San DiegoUniversity of California, San DiegoEconomic games involving allocation of resources have been a useful tool for the study of decision making for both psychologists and economists. In two experiments involving a repeated-trials game over twenty opportunities, undergraduates made choices to distribute resources between themselves and an unseen, passive other either optimally (for themselves) but non-competitively, equally but non-optimally, or least optimally but competitively. Surprisingly, whether participants were told that the anonymous other was another student or a computer did not matter. Using such terms as “game” and “player” in the course of the session was associated with an increased frequency of competitive behavior. Males were more optimal than females: a gender-by-incentive interaction was found in the first experiment. In agreement with prior research, participants whose resources were backed by monetary incentive acted the most optimally. Overall, equality was the modal strategy employed, although it is clear that motivational context affects the allocation of resources.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500000851/type/journal_articledistributive fairnessgenderhuman-computer interactionmonetary incentiveresource allocationSharing Game
spellingShingle Arthur Kennelly
Edmund Fantino
The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types
Judgment and Decision Making
distributive fairness
gender
human-computer interaction
monetary incentive
resource allocation
Sharing Game
title The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types
title_full The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types
title_fullStr The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types
title_full_unstemmed The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types
title_short The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types
title_sort sharing game fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive gender and recipient types
topic distributive fairness
gender
human-computer interaction
monetary incentive
resource allocation
Sharing Game
url https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500000851/type/journal_article
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