The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types
Economic games involving allocation of resources have been a useful tool for the study of decision making for both psychologists and economists. In two experiments involving a repeated-trials game over twenty opportunities, undergraduates made choices to distribute resources between themselves and a...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2007-06-01
|
Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500000851/type/journal_article |
_version_ | 1797701689079234560 |
---|---|
author | Arthur Kennelly Edmund Fantino |
author_facet | Arthur Kennelly Edmund Fantino |
author_sort | Arthur Kennelly |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Economic games involving allocation of resources have been a useful tool for the study of decision making for both psychologists and economists. In two experiments involving a repeated-trials game over twenty opportunities, undergraduates made choices to distribute resources between themselves and an unseen, passive other either optimally (for themselves) but non-competitively, equally but non-optimally, or least optimally but competitively. Surprisingly, whether participants were told that the anonymous other was another student or a computer did not matter. Using such terms as “game” and “player” in the course of the session was associated with an increased frequency of competitive behavior. Males were more optimal than females: a gender-by-incentive interaction was found in the first experiment. In agreement with prior research, participants whose resources were backed by monetary incentive acted the most optimally. Overall, equality was the modal strategy employed, although it is clear that motivational context affects the allocation of resources. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-12T04:39:21Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-c0671a79617c47edae580fe872febd3a |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1930-2975 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-12T04:39:21Z |
publishDate | 2007-06-01 |
publisher | Cambridge University Press |
record_format | Article |
series | Judgment and Decision Making |
spelling | doaj.art-c0671a79617c47edae580fe872febd3a2023-09-03T09:45:59ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752007-06-01220421610.1017/S1930297500000851The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient typesArthur Kennelly0Edmund Fantino1University of California, San DiegoUniversity of California, San DiegoEconomic games involving allocation of resources have been a useful tool for the study of decision making for both psychologists and economists. In two experiments involving a repeated-trials game over twenty opportunities, undergraduates made choices to distribute resources between themselves and an unseen, passive other either optimally (for themselves) but non-competitively, equally but non-optimally, or least optimally but competitively. Surprisingly, whether participants were told that the anonymous other was another student or a computer did not matter. Using such terms as “game” and “player” in the course of the session was associated with an increased frequency of competitive behavior. Males were more optimal than females: a gender-by-incentive interaction was found in the first experiment. In agreement with prior research, participants whose resources were backed by monetary incentive acted the most optimally. Overall, equality was the modal strategy employed, although it is clear that motivational context affects the allocation of resources.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500000851/type/journal_articledistributive fairnessgenderhuman-computer interactionmonetary incentiveresource allocationSharing Game |
spellingShingle | Arthur Kennelly Edmund Fantino The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types Judgment and Decision Making distributive fairness gender human-computer interaction monetary incentive resource allocation Sharing Game |
title | The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types |
title_full | The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types |
title_fullStr | The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types |
title_full_unstemmed | The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types |
title_short | The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types |
title_sort | sharing game fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive gender and recipient types |
topic | distributive fairness gender human-computer interaction monetary incentive resource allocation Sharing Game |
url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500000851/type/journal_article |
work_keys_str_mv | AT arthurkennelly thesharinggamefairnessinresourceallocationasafunctionofincentivegenderandrecipienttypes AT edmundfantino thesharinggamefairnessinresourceallocationasafunctionofincentivegenderandrecipienttypes AT arthurkennelly sharinggamefairnessinresourceallocationasafunctionofincentivegenderandrecipienttypes AT edmundfantino sharinggamefairnessinresourceallocationasafunctionofincentivegenderandrecipienttypes |