An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling.

The handicap principle has come under significant challenge both from empirical studies and from theoretical work. As a result, a number of alternative explanations for honest signaling have been proposed. This paper compares the evolutionary plausibility of one such alternative, the "hybrid eq...

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Main Authors: Patrick Kane, Kevin J S Zollman
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2015-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4562630?pdf=render
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author Patrick Kane
Kevin J S Zollman
author_facet Patrick Kane
Kevin J S Zollman
author_sort Patrick Kane
collection DOAJ
description The handicap principle has come under significant challenge both from empirical studies and from theoretical work. As a result, a number of alternative explanations for honest signaling have been proposed. This paper compares the evolutionary plausibility of one such alternative, the "hybrid equilibrium," to the handicap principle. We utilize computer simulations to compare these two theories as they are instantiated in Maynard Smith's Sir Philip Sidney game. We conclude that, when both types of communication are possible, evolution is unlikely to lead to handicap signaling and is far more likely to result in the partially honest signaling predicted by hybrid equilibrium theory.
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spelling doaj.art-c0dd1bb966454ba1a3624ccf2f4f62d42022-12-21T19:46:02ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032015-01-01109e013727110.1371/journal.pone.0137271An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling.Patrick KaneKevin J S ZollmanThe handicap principle has come under significant challenge both from empirical studies and from theoretical work. As a result, a number of alternative explanations for honest signaling have been proposed. This paper compares the evolutionary plausibility of one such alternative, the "hybrid equilibrium," to the handicap principle. We utilize computer simulations to compare these two theories as they are instantiated in Maynard Smith's Sir Philip Sidney game. We conclude that, when both types of communication are possible, evolution is unlikely to lead to handicap signaling and is far more likely to result in the partially honest signaling predicted by hybrid equilibrium theory.http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4562630?pdf=render
spellingShingle Patrick Kane
Kevin J S Zollman
An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling.
PLoS ONE
title An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling.
title_full An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling.
title_fullStr An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling.
title_full_unstemmed An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling.
title_short An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling.
title_sort evolutionary comparison of the handicap principle and hybrid equilibrium theories of signaling
url http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4562630?pdf=render
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