Consciousness: individuated information in action

Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imp...

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Main Author: Jakub Adam Jonkisz
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Frontiers Media S.A. 2015-07-01
Series:Frontiers in Psychology
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01035/full
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author Jakub Adam Jonkisz
author_facet Jakub Adam Jonkisz
author_sort Jakub Adam Jonkisz
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description Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system) and useful in action (pragmatically functional), is a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. A gradational approach, however, despite its explanatory advantages, can lead to some counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. In most such conceptions consciousness is extended globally (attached to primitive organisms or artificial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-level neuronal and bodily processes). For example, according to information integration theory (as introduced recently by Tononi and Koch), even such simple artificial systems as photodiodes possess miniscule amounts of consciousness. The major challenge for this article, then, is to establish reasonable, empirically justified constraints on how extended the range of a graded consciousness could be. It is argued that conscious systems are limited globally by the ability to individuate information (where individuated information is understood as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered and private), whereas local limitations should be determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Using these constraints, an abstract concept of consciousness is arrived at, hopefully contributing to a more unified state of play within consciousness studies itself.
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spelling doaj.art-c16631f015ed478db34fb9508b946ad72022-12-21T20:36:56ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782015-07-01610.3389/fpsyg.2015.01035149261Consciousness: individuated information in actionJakub Adam Jonkisz0University of Bielsko-BialaWithin theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system) and useful in action (pragmatically functional), is a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. A gradational approach, however, despite its explanatory advantages, can lead to some counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. In most such conceptions consciousness is extended globally (attached to primitive organisms or artificial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-level neuronal and bodily processes). For example, according to information integration theory (as introduced recently by Tononi and Koch), even such simple artificial systems as photodiodes possess miniscule amounts of consciousness. The major challenge for this article, then, is to establish reasonable, empirically justified constraints on how extended the range of a graded consciousness could be. It is argued that conscious systems are limited globally by the ability to individuate information (where individuated information is understood as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered and private), whereas local limitations should be determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Using these constraints, an abstract concept of consciousness is arrived at, hopefully contributing to a more unified state of play within consciousness studies itself.http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01035/fullsubjectivityIntegrated informationExtended consciousnessSensorimotor consciousnessTaxonomy of consciousnessindividuated information
spellingShingle Jakub Adam Jonkisz
Consciousness: individuated information in action
Frontiers in Psychology
subjectivity
Integrated information
Extended consciousness
Sensorimotor consciousness
Taxonomy of consciousness
individuated information
title Consciousness: individuated information in action
title_full Consciousness: individuated information in action
title_fullStr Consciousness: individuated information in action
title_full_unstemmed Consciousness: individuated information in action
title_short Consciousness: individuated information in action
title_sort consciousness individuated information in action
topic subjectivity
Integrated information
Extended consciousness
Sensorimotor consciousness
Taxonomy of consciousness
individuated information
url http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01035/full
work_keys_str_mv AT jakubadamjonkisz consciousnessindividuatedinformationinaction