At the Expense of Quality
Many organizations use employee referral programs to incentivize employees to refer potential applicants from their social networks. Employers frequently offer a monetary bonus to employees who refer an applicant, and this is often contingent on whether the person is then hired and retained for a gi...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Society for Sociological Science
2018-06-01
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| Series: | Sociological Science |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.sociologicalscience.com/articles-v5-17-380/ |
| _version_ | 1831742226449825792 |
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| author | Brittany M. Bond Tatiana Labuzova Roberto M. Fernandez |
| author_facet | Brittany M. Bond Tatiana Labuzova Roberto M. Fernandez |
| author_sort | Brittany M. Bond |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Many organizations use employee referral programs to incentivize employees to refer potential applicants from their social networks. Employers frequently offer a monetary bonus to employees who refer an applicant, and this is often contingent on whether the person is then hired and retained for a given length of time. In deciding whether to refer someone, referrers face a potential role conflict, as they need to balance their motivations for helping connections find job opportunities with concerns regarding their reputations with their employers. To the extent that monetary incentives shift an employee's considerations away from finding the best matches for the employer, referral bonuses may increase the chances that lower-quality candidates are referred. Using a survey vignette experiment, we find that even a small referral bonus increases the likelihood that referrers will refer lower-quality candidates, and they are more likely to refer people they do not know well. We further discuss theoretical and practical implications regarding the efficiency of incentivized referral programs in producing quality applicant pools for employers. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-21T14:30:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-c21082d16f1c4eeeb6df252a8c4ad966 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2330-6696 2330-6696 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-21T14:30:27Z |
| publishDate | 2018-06-01 |
| publisher | Society for Sociological Science |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Sociological Science |
| spelling | doaj.art-c21082d16f1c4eeeb6df252a8c4ad9662022-12-21T19:00:31ZengSociety for Sociological ScienceSociological Science2330-66962330-66962018-06-0151738040110.15195/v5.a17At the Expense of QualityBrittany M. Bond0Tatiana Labuzova1Roberto M. Fernandez2Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyMany organizations use employee referral programs to incentivize employees to refer potential applicants from their social networks. Employers frequently offer a monetary bonus to employees who refer an applicant, and this is often contingent on whether the person is then hired and retained for a given length of time. In deciding whether to refer someone, referrers face a potential role conflict, as they need to balance their motivations for helping connections find job opportunities with concerns regarding their reputations with their employers. To the extent that monetary incentives shift an employee's considerations away from finding the best matches for the employer, referral bonuses may increase the chances that lower-quality candidates are referred. Using a survey vignette experiment, we find that even a small referral bonus increases the likelihood that referrers will refer lower-quality candidates, and they are more likely to refer people they do not know well. We further discuss theoretical and practical implications regarding the efficiency of incentivized referral programs in producing quality applicant pools for employers.https://www.sociologicalscience.com/articles-v5-17-380/HiringEmployer Referral ProgramsLabor MarketSocial Networks |
| spellingShingle | Brittany M. Bond Tatiana Labuzova Roberto M. Fernandez At the Expense of Quality Sociological Science Hiring Employer Referral Programs Labor Market Social Networks |
| title | At the Expense of Quality |
| title_full | At the Expense of Quality |
| title_fullStr | At the Expense of Quality |
| title_full_unstemmed | At the Expense of Quality |
| title_short | At the Expense of Quality |
| title_sort | at the expense of quality |
| topic | Hiring Employer Referral Programs Labor Market Social Networks |
| url | https://www.sociologicalscience.com/articles-v5-17-380/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT brittanymbond attheexpenseofquality AT tatianalabuzova attheexpenseofquality AT robertomfernandez attheexpenseofquality |