| Summary: | In the article inspired by Putnam’s thesis of „skolemisation of absolutely everything” (which is so called theory-modelling argument about semantic anti-realism) I try to describe Hilary Putnam’s style of philosophy, especially his argumentation in benefit of “internal realism”, epistemic understanding of truth and (alleged) anti-relativism. On the base of delved analysis I state that undertaken by Putnam strategy of realism defence – because of reasons that can be together called “Putnamism of absolutely everything” – is totally inefficient. Moreover, despite of all differences and declared by Putnam divergences, it is, at least in a tendency, coherent with Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, later Wittgenstein’s conception of “language games” and Derrida’s open postmodernism. Although Rorty’s neo-pragmatism should be called “hard neo-pragmatism” (contesting neo-pragmatism), Putnam’s neo-pragmatism can be at a pinch called “soft neo-pragmatism”. It is caused by the fact that he does not resign from the notion of truth completely, and keeps a lot of reserve towards the thesis about incoherence of discourses. In debt of it Putnam’s position becomes open for probable modifications and amendments, also concerning issue of internal realism (global or local?).
|
|---|