What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models
The nature of consciousness is considered one of science’s most perplexing and persistent mysteries. We all know the subjective experience of consciousness, but where does it arise? What is its purpose? What are its full capacities? The assumption within today’s neuroscience is that all aspects of c...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2022-09-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
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| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.955594/full |
| _version_ | 1811275788339642368 |
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| author | Helané Wahbeh Dean Radin Cedric Cannard Arnaud Delorme Arnaud Delorme |
| author_facet | Helané Wahbeh Dean Radin Cedric Cannard Arnaud Delorme Arnaud Delorme |
| author_sort | Helané Wahbeh |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The nature of consciousness is considered one of science’s most perplexing and persistent mysteries. We all know the subjective experience of consciousness, but where does it arise? What is its purpose? What are its full capacities? The assumption within today’s neuroscience is that all aspects of consciousness arise solely from interactions among neurons in the brain. However, the origin and mechanisms of qualia (i.e., subjective or phenomenological experience) are not understood. David Chalmers coined the term “the hard problem” to describe the difficulties in elucidating the origins of subjectivity from the point of view of reductive materialism. We propose that the hard problem arises because one or more assumptions within a materialistic worldview are either wrong or incomplete. If consciousness entails more than the activity of neurons, then we can contemplate new ways of thinking about the hard problem. This review examines phenomena that apparently contradict the notion that consciousness is exclusively dependent on brain activity, including phenomena where consciousness appears to extend beyond the physical brain and body in both space and time. The mechanisms underlying these “non-local” properties are vaguely suggestive of quantum entanglement in physics, but how such effects might manifest remains highly speculative. The existence of these non-local effects appears to support the proposal that post-materialistic models of consciousness may be required to break the conceptual impasse presented by the hard problem of consciousness. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T23:44:05Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-c27bd9f0c4fc42108674c84b847754ba |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1664-1078 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T23:44:05Z |
| publishDate | 2022-09-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Psychology |
| spelling | doaj.art-c27bd9f0c4fc42108674c84b847754ba2022-12-22T03:11:54ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782022-09-011310.3389/fpsyg.2022.955594955594What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic modelsHelané Wahbeh0Dean Radin1Cedric Cannard2Arnaud Delorme3Arnaud Delorme4Research Department, Institute of Noetic Sciences, Petaluma, CA, United StatesResearch Department, Institute of Noetic Sciences, Petaluma, CA, United StatesResearch Department, Institute of Noetic Sciences, Petaluma, CA, United StatesResearch Department, Institute of Noetic Sciences, Petaluma, CA, United StatesSwartz Center for Computational Neuroscience, Institute of Neural Computation, University of California, San Diego, San Diego, CA, United StatesThe nature of consciousness is considered one of science’s most perplexing and persistent mysteries. We all know the subjective experience of consciousness, but where does it arise? What is its purpose? What are its full capacities? The assumption within today’s neuroscience is that all aspects of consciousness arise solely from interactions among neurons in the brain. However, the origin and mechanisms of qualia (i.e., subjective or phenomenological experience) are not understood. David Chalmers coined the term “the hard problem” to describe the difficulties in elucidating the origins of subjectivity from the point of view of reductive materialism. We propose that the hard problem arises because one or more assumptions within a materialistic worldview are either wrong or incomplete. If consciousness entails more than the activity of neurons, then we can contemplate new ways of thinking about the hard problem. This review examines phenomena that apparently contradict the notion that consciousness is exclusively dependent on brain activity, including phenomena where consciousness appears to extend beyond the physical brain and body in both space and time. The mechanisms underlying these “non-local” properties are vaguely suggestive of quantum entanglement in physics, but how such effects might manifest remains highly speculative. The existence of these non-local effects appears to support the proposal that post-materialistic models of consciousness may be required to break the conceptual impasse presented by the hard problem of consciousness.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.955594/fullnon-local consciousnessorch-ORintegrated information theoryglobal work-space theorieshigher-order theoriesre-entry and predictive processing |
| spellingShingle | Helané Wahbeh Dean Radin Cedric Cannard Arnaud Delorme Arnaud Delorme What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models Frontiers in Psychology non-local consciousness orch-OR integrated information theory global work-space theories higher-order theories re-entry and predictive processing |
| title | What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models |
| title_full | What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models |
| title_fullStr | What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models |
| title_full_unstemmed | What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models |
| title_short | What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models |
| title_sort | what if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models |
| topic | non-local consciousness orch-OR integrated information theory global work-space theories higher-order theories re-entry and predictive processing |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.955594/full |
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