How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies?
To effectively address the mental health risks associated with public health emergencies, it is crucial to actively manage rumors. This study explores the dynamic evolutionary process of rumor diffusion and its collaborative governance in public health emergencies. A game-theoretic model is construc...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Public Health |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1290841/full |
| _version_ | 1797362498351923200 |
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| author | Yalin Wang Liping Qi Shaoshuo Cai |
| author_facet | Yalin Wang Liping Qi Shaoshuo Cai |
| author_sort | Yalin Wang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | To effectively address the mental health risks associated with public health emergencies, it is crucial to actively manage rumors. This study explores the dynamic evolutionary process of rumor diffusion and its collaborative governance in public health emergencies. A game-theoretic model is constructed, involving three main actors: regulators, parties involved in public health emergencies (PIPHE), and whistle-blowers. The behaviors and game outcomes of each party are analyzed, and the effectiveness and feasibility of the model are validated through numerical simulations. The findings of this study reveal that various factors, such as regulatory costs, penalty income, reputation damage for regulators; image loss, reputation enhancement, penalty expenditure for PIPHE; and time costs, social responsibility, and reward income for whistle-blowers, all influence the behavioral choices and game equilibrium of each party. Optimization strategies for rumor governance are proposed in this study, including enhancing the sense of responsibility and capability among regulators, increasing transparency and credibility among PIPHE, and encouraging and protecting the participation of whistle-blowers. This study provides a comprehensive analytical framework for rumor governance in public health emergencies, contributing to improving the governance of public health emergencies and maintaining online public health orders for social sustainability. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T16:08:43Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-c2a7eb305ae64874a2511dcf66a0c68e |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2296-2565 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T16:08:43Z |
| publishDate | 2024-01-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Public Health |
| spelling | doaj.art-c2a7eb305ae64874a2511dcf66a0c68e2024-01-08T04:44:13ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Public Health2296-25652024-01-011110.3389/fpubh.2023.12908411290841How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies?Yalin Wang0Liping Qi1Shaoshuo Cai2Guangzhou Huashang College, Guangzhou, ChinaSchool of Humanities, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, ChinaSchool of Journalism and Communication, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, ChinaTo effectively address the mental health risks associated with public health emergencies, it is crucial to actively manage rumors. This study explores the dynamic evolutionary process of rumor diffusion and its collaborative governance in public health emergencies. A game-theoretic model is constructed, involving three main actors: regulators, parties involved in public health emergencies (PIPHE), and whistle-blowers. The behaviors and game outcomes of each party are analyzed, and the effectiveness and feasibility of the model are validated through numerical simulations. The findings of this study reveal that various factors, such as regulatory costs, penalty income, reputation damage for regulators; image loss, reputation enhancement, penalty expenditure for PIPHE; and time costs, social responsibility, and reward income for whistle-blowers, all influence the behavioral choices and game equilibrium of each party. Optimization strategies for rumor governance are proposed in this study, including enhancing the sense of responsibility and capability among regulators, increasing transparency and credibility among PIPHE, and encouraging and protecting the participation of whistle-blowers. This study provides a comprehensive analytical framework for rumor governance in public health emergencies, contributing to improving the governance of public health emergencies and maintaining online public health orders for social sustainability.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1290841/fullpublic health emergenciesrumor managementcollaborative governancesocial sustainabilityevolutionary games |
| spellingShingle | Yalin Wang Liping Qi Shaoshuo Cai How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies? Frontiers in Public Health public health emergencies rumor management collaborative governance social sustainability evolutionary games |
| title | How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies? |
| title_full | How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies? |
| title_fullStr | How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies? |
| title_full_unstemmed | How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies? |
| title_short | How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies? |
| title_sort | how can the collaborative participation of regulators whistleblowers and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies |
| topic | public health emergencies rumor management collaborative governance social sustainability evolutionary games |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1290841/full |
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