Not All Structure and Dynamics Are Equal
The hard problem of consciousness has been a perennially vexing issue for the study of consciousness, particularly in giving a scientific and naturalized account of phenomenal experience. At the heart of the hard problem is an often-overlooked argument, which is at the core of the hard problem, and...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2021-09-01
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| Series: | Entropy |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/23/9/1226 |
| _version_ | 1797519369038725120 |
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| author | Garrett Mindt |
| author_facet | Garrett Mindt |
| author_sort | Garrett Mindt |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The hard problem of consciousness has been a perennially vexing issue for the study of consciousness, particularly in giving a scientific and naturalized account of phenomenal experience. At the heart of the hard problem is an often-overlooked argument, which is at the core of the hard problem, and that is the structure and dynamics (S&D) argument. In this essay, I will argue that we have good reason to suspect that the S&D argument given by David Chalmers rests on a limited conception of S&D properties, what in this essay I’m calling extrinsic structure and dynamics. I argue that if we take recent insights from the complexity sciences and from recent developments in Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness, that we get a more nuanced picture of S&D, specifically, a class of properties I’m calling intrinsic structure and dynamics. This I think opens the door to a broader class of properties with which we might naturally and scientifically explain phenomenal experience, as well as the relationship between syntactic, semantic, and intrinsic notions of information. I argue that Chalmers’ characterization of structure and dynamics in his S&D argument paints them with too broad a brush and fails to account for important nuances, especially when considering accounting for a system’s intrinsic properties. Ultimately, my hope is to vindicate a certain species of explanation from the S&D argument, and by extension dissolve the hard problem of consciousness at its core, by showing that not all structure and dynamics are equal. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-10T07:41:54Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-c349797601504397ab9bc8436976cb70 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1099-4300 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-10T07:41:54Z |
| publishDate | 2021-09-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Entropy |
| spelling | doaj.art-c349797601504397ab9bc8436976cb702023-11-22T12:58:37ZengMDPI AGEntropy1099-43002021-09-01239122610.3390/e23091226Not All Structure and Dynamics Are EqualGarrett Mindt0Elizabeth R Koch Research Fellow, Tiny Blue Dot Foundation for Consciousness Studies, Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI 53719, USAThe hard problem of consciousness has been a perennially vexing issue for the study of consciousness, particularly in giving a scientific and naturalized account of phenomenal experience. At the heart of the hard problem is an often-overlooked argument, which is at the core of the hard problem, and that is the structure and dynamics (S&D) argument. In this essay, I will argue that we have good reason to suspect that the S&D argument given by David Chalmers rests on a limited conception of S&D properties, what in this essay I’m calling extrinsic structure and dynamics. I argue that if we take recent insights from the complexity sciences and from recent developments in Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness, that we get a more nuanced picture of S&D, specifically, a class of properties I’m calling intrinsic structure and dynamics. This I think opens the door to a broader class of properties with which we might naturally and scientifically explain phenomenal experience, as well as the relationship between syntactic, semantic, and intrinsic notions of information. I argue that Chalmers’ characterization of structure and dynamics in his S&D argument paints them with too broad a brush and fails to account for important nuances, especially when considering accounting for a system’s intrinsic properties. Ultimately, my hope is to vindicate a certain species of explanation from the S&D argument, and by extension dissolve the hard problem of consciousness at its core, by showing that not all structure and dynamics are equal.https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/23/9/1226consciousnessphysicalismstructure and dynamicshard problemcomplexityIntegrated Information Theory |
| spellingShingle | Garrett Mindt Not All Structure and Dynamics Are Equal Entropy consciousness physicalism structure and dynamics hard problem complexity Integrated Information Theory |
| title | Not All Structure and Dynamics Are Equal |
| title_full | Not All Structure and Dynamics Are Equal |
| title_fullStr | Not All Structure and Dynamics Are Equal |
| title_full_unstemmed | Not All Structure and Dynamics Are Equal |
| title_short | Not All Structure and Dynamics Are Equal |
| title_sort | not all structure and dynamics are equal |
| topic | consciousness physicalism structure and dynamics hard problem complexity Integrated Information Theory |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/23/9/1226 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT garrettmindt notallstructureanddynamicsareequal |