The First Half of the Trascendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B)

After the publication of Strawson’s “The Bounds of Sense”, the Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has been widely regarded as a proof of the objectivity of knowledge as a condition of unity of self-consciousness. Nevertheless, many interpreters accept that there are passages...

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Main Author: Hirotaka Nakano
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidad Nacional de Colombia 2008-08-01
Series:Ideas y Valores
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.ideasyvalores.unal.edu.co/archivos/PDF137/12_nakano.pdf
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author Hirotaka Nakano
author_facet Hirotaka Nakano
author_sort Hirotaka Nakano
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description After the publication of Strawson’s “The Bounds of Sense”, the Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has been widely regarded as a proof of the objectivity of knowledge as a condition of unity of self-consciousness. Nevertheless, many interpreters accept that there are passages which cannot be easily integrated into such a strategy. In this article, through an analysis of the first half of the Transcendental Deduction (B), I try to point out the need to adopt a different interpretation according to which Kant does not consider objectivity as a condition of self-consciousness, but rather self-consciousness as a necessary condition of objectivity.
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spelling doaj.art-c4063fd12ae5446cb992452b547140af2022-12-21T23:58:56ZengUniversidad Nacional de ColombiaIdeas y Valores0120-00622008-08-015713793111The First Half of the Trascendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B)Hirotaka NakanoAfter the publication of Strawson’s “The Bounds of Sense”, the Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has been widely regarded as a proof of the objectivity of knowledge as a condition of unity of self-consciousness. Nevertheless, many interpreters accept that there are passages which cannot be easily integrated into such a strategy. In this article, through an analysis of the first half of the Transcendental Deduction (B), I try to point out the need to adopt a different interpretation according to which Kant does not consider objectivity as a condition of self-consciousness, but rather self-consciousness as a necessary condition of objectivity.http://www.ideasyvalores.unal.edu.co/archivos/PDF137/12_nakano.pdfTranscendental DeductionKantobjectivityself-consciousness.
spellingShingle Hirotaka Nakano
The First Half of the Trascendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B)
Ideas y Valores
Transcendental Deduction
Kant
objectivity
self-consciousness.
title The First Half of the Trascendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B)
title_full The First Half of the Trascendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B)
title_fullStr The First Half of the Trascendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B)
title_full_unstemmed The First Half of the Trascendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B)
title_short The First Half of the Trascendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B)
title_sort first half of the trascendental deduction in kant s critique of pure reason b
topic Transcendental Deduction
Kant
objectivity
self-consciousness.
url http://www.ideasyvalores.unal.edu.co/archivos/PDF137/12_nakano.pdf
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