Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing
In this paper, we propose effective data collection schemes that stimulate cooperation between selfish users in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing. A query issuer generates a query and requests replies within a given delay budget. When a data provider receives the query for the first time from an int...
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MDPI AG
2016-07-01
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| Series: | Sensors |
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| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/16/7/1138 |
| _version_ | 1798024629411905536 |
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| author | Yang Liu Fan Li Yu Wang |
| author_facet | Yang Liu Fan Li Yu Wang |
| author_sort | Yang Liu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper, we propose effective data collection schemes that stimulate cooperation between selfish users in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing. A query issuer generates a query and requests replies within a given delay budget. When a data provider receives the query for the first time from an intermediate user, the former replies to it and authorizes the latter as the owner of the reply. Different data providers can reply to the same query. When a user that owns a reply meets the query issuer that generates the query, it requests the query issuer to pay credits. The query issuer pays credits and provides feedback to the data provider, which gives the reply. When a user that carries a feedback meets the data provider, the data provider pays credits to the user in order to adjust its claimed expertise. Queries, replies and feedbacks can be traded between mobile users. We propose an effective mechanism to define rewards for queries, replies and feedbacks. We formulate the bargain process as a two-person cooperative game, whose solution is found by using the Nash theorem. To improve the credit circulation, we design an online auction process, in which the wealthy user can buy replies and feedbacks from the starving one using credits. We have carried out extensive simulations based on real-world traces to evaluate the proposed schemes. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T18:05:41Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-c4b134cf77374925904ac554ac24fd75 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1424-8220 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T18:05:41Z |
| publishDate | 2016-07-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Sensors |
| spelling | doaj.art-c4b134cf77374925904ac554ac24fd752022-12-22T04:10:21ZengMDPI AGSensors1424-82202016-07-01167113810.3390/s16071138s16071138Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic CrowdsensingYang Liu0Fan Li1Yu Wang2School of Automation, Beijing Institute of Technology, 5 South Zhongguancun Street, Haidian District, Beijing 100081, ChinaSchool of Computer Science and Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, 5 South Zhongguancun Street, Haidian District, Beijing 100081, ChinaCollege of Computing and Informatics, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 9201 University City Blvd., Charlotte, NC 28223-0001, USAIn this paper, we propose effective data collection schemes that stimulate cooperation between selfish users in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing. A query issuer generates a query and requests replies within a given delay budget. When a data provider receives the query for the first time from an intermediate user, the former replies to it and authorizes the latter as the owner of the reply. Different data providers can reply to the same query. When a user that owns a reply meets the query issuer that generates the query, it requests the query issuer to pay credits. The query issuer pays credits and provides feedback to the data provider, which gives the reply. When a user that carries a feedback meets the data provider, the data provider pays credits to the user in order to adjust its claimed expertise. Queries, replies and feedbacks can be traded between mobile users. We propose an effective mechanism to define rewards for queries, replies and feedbacks. We formulate the bargain process as a two-person cooperative game, whose solution is found by using the Nash theorem. To improve the credit circulation, we design an online auction process, in which the wealthy user can buy replies and feedbacks from the starving one using credits. We have carried out extensive simulations based on real-world traces to evaluate the proposed schemes.http://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/16/7/1138mobile opportunistic crowdsensingincentive mechanismdata querytwo-person cooperative gameoptimal stopping theory |
| spellingShingle | Yang Liu Fan Li Yu Wang Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing Sensors mobile opportunistic crowdsensing incentive mechanism data query two-person cooperative game optimal stopping theory |
| title | Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing |
| title_full | Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing |
| title_fullStr | Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing |
| title_full_unstemmed | Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing |
| title_short | Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing |
| title_sort | incentives for delay constrained data query and feedback in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing |
| topic | mobile opportunistic crowdsensing incentive mechanism data query two-person cooperative game optimal stopping theory |
| url | http://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/16/7/1138 |
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