How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility
Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions o...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Estadual de Campinas
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| Series: | Manuscrito |
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| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000100005&lng=en&tlng=en |
| Summary: | Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. I argue that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent-i.e., being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons-dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren't at odds. |
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| ISSN: | 2317-630X |