How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility
Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions o...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Estadual de Campinas
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| Series: | Manuscrito |
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| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000100005&lng=en&tlng=en |
| _version_ | 1818652110183464960 |
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| author | Fernando Rudy Hiller |
| author_facet | Fernando Rudy Hiller |
| author_sort | Fernando Rudy Hiller |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. I argue that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent-i.e., being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons-dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren't at odds. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-17T02:16:47Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-c5bbeef1a1df40c88f19b987662b7f05 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2317-630X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-17T02:16:47Z |
| publisher | Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Manuscrito |
| spelling | doaj.art-c5bbeef1a1df40c88f19b987662b7f052022-12-21T22:07:23ZengUniversidade Estadual de CampinasManuscrito2317-630X39153210.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N1.FRHS0100-60452016000100005How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibilityFernando Rudy HillerAbstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. I argue that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent-i.e., being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons-dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren't at odds.http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000100005&lng=en&tlng=encontrolfair opportunityreasons-responsivenessresponsibilitymoral luckNagel |
| spellingShingle | Fernando Rudy Hiller How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility Manuscrito control fair opportunity reasons-responsiveness responsibility moral luck Nagel |
| title | How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility |
| title_full | How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility |
| title_fullStr | How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility |
| title_full_unstemmed | How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility |
| title_short | How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility |
| title_sort | how to dis solve nagel s paradox about moral luck and responsibility |
| topic | control fair opportunity reasons-responsiveness responsibility moral luck Nagel |
| url | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000100005&lng=en&tlng=en |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fernandorudyhiller howtodissolvenagelsparadoxaboutmoralluckandresponsibility |