How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility
Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions o...
Main Author: | Fernando Rudy Hiller |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas
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Series: | Manuscrito |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000100005&lng=en&tlng=en |
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