Can command-and-control policy drive low-carbon transition in energy-intensive enterprises? -a study based on evolutionary game theory
There are two views on whether command-and-control policy can promote carbon emission reduction: the “compliance cost” theory and the “innovation compensation” theory. In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model among energy-intensive enterprises, verification agencies, and local governme...
Main Authors: | Chunxi Zhou, Yang Han, Ruiqi Zhang |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2023-08-01
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Series: | Frontiers in Energy Research |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenrg.2023.1247780/full |
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