Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IOP Publishing
2016-01-01
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| Series: | New Journal of Physics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/18/8/083021 |
| _version_ | 1827873770071654400 |
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| author | Attila Szolnoki Matjaž Perc |
| author_facet | Attila Szolnoki Matjaž Perc |
| author_sort | Attila Szolnoki |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant players are also present. Depending on the number of defectors within a group, a tolerant player can either cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game. We show that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with a different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a group compete most effectively against defection and default abstinence. Such synergistic associations can stabilise states of full cooperation where otherwise defection would dominate. We observe complex pattern formation that gives rise to an intricate phase diagram, where invisible yet stable strategy alliances require outmost care lest they are overlooked. Our results highlight the delicate importance of diversity and tolerance for the provisioning of public goods, and they reveal fascinating subtleties of the spatiotemporal dynamics that is due to the competition of subsystem solutions in structured populations. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:41:46Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-c641bb668ffb48d7ad7a927f1960bb41 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1367-2630 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:41:46Z |
| publishDate | 2016-01-01 |
| publisher | IOP Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | New Journal of Physics |
| spelling | doaj.art-c641bb668ffb48d7ad7a927f1960bb412023-08-08T14:29:39ZengIOP PublishingNew Journal of Physics1367-26302016-01-0118808302110.1088/1367-2630/18/8/083021Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods gameAttila Szolnoki0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0907-0406Matjaž Perc1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3087-541XInstitute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P O Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, HungaryFaculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor , Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia; CAMTP—Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Maribor , Krekova 2, SI-2000 Maribor, SloveniaTolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant players are also present. Depending on the number of defectors within a group, a tolerant player can either cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game. We show that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with a different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a group compete most effectively against defection and default abstinence. Such synergistic associations can stabilise states of full cooperation where otherwise defection would dominate. We observe complex pattern formation that gives rise to an intricate phase diagram, where invisible yet stable strategy alliances require outmost care lest they are overlooked. Our results highlight the delicate importance of diversity and tolerance for the provisioning of public goods, and they reveal fascinating subtleties of the spatiotemporal dynamics that is due to the competition of subsystem solutions in structured populations.https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/18/8/083021evolutionary game theorypublic goods gamehuman cooperation89.75.Fb87.23.Ge89.65.-s |
| spellingShingle | Attila Szolnoki Matjaž Perc Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game New Journal of Physics evolutionary game theory public goods game human cooperation 89.75.Fb 87.23.Ge 89.65.-s |
| title | Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game |
| title_full | Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game |
| title_fullStr | Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game |
| title_full_unstemmed | Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game |
| title_short | Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game |
| title_sort | competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game |
| topic | evolutionary game theory public goods game human cooperation 89.75.Fb 87.23.Ge 89.65.-s |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/18/8/083021 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT attilaszolnoki competitionoftolerantstrategiesinthespatialpublicgoodsgame AT matjazperc competitionoftolerantstrategiesinthespatialpublicgoodsgame |