Examining the Possibility of Refuting Philosophical Skepticism by Accepting Semantic Externalism

According to semantic externalism, the meaning of some words and thus the content of some of our mental states is determined at least partly by features of the external world. For the first time, Putnam has tried to argue that accepting externalism leads to the rejection of skepticism about the exte...

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Main Author: Hamid Alaeinejad
Format: Article
Language:fas
Published: Allameh Tabataba'i University Press 2019-12-01
Series:حکمت و فلسفه
Subjects:
Online Access:https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_12004_fc2a3ca6d83896ea6815a99291fed52f.pdf
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author Hamid Alaeinejad
author_facet Hamid Alaeinejad
author_sort Hamid Alaeinejad
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description According to semantic externalism, the meaning of some words and thus the content of some of our mental states is determined at least partly by features of the external world. For the first time, Putnam has tried to argue that accepting externalism leads to the rejection of skepticism about the external world. However, it is widely argued that this argument does not work; therefore, some philosophers have tried to provide an alternative argument that, by accepting the semantic externalism approach, will succeed in rejecting skepticism about the external world. Nevertheless, these arguments are subject to further criticisms. In this paper, I attempt to develop some arguments to show that none of these externalist arguments succeed in rejecting skepticism. On the other hand, using the basic idea of skepticism in rejecting the possibility of acquiring knowledge, I suggest a new externalist argument on which basis it can be correctly claimed that skepticism is an untenable position.
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spelling doaj.art-c6ceb107abd449549b87b79cc352f86c2023-12-18T10:46:37ZfasAllameh Tabataba'i University Pressحکمت و فلسفه1735-32382476-60382019-12-01156015918310.22054/wph.2020.43549.173612004Examining the Possibility of Refuting Philosophical Skepticism by Accepting Semantic ExternalismHamid Alaeinejad0Postdoc Researcher of Philosophy, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranAccording to semantic externalism, the meaning of some words and thus the content of some of our mental states is determined at least partly by features of the external world. For the first time, Putnam has tried to argue that accepting externalism leads to the rejection of skepticism about the external world. However, it is widely argued that this argument does not work; therefore, some philosophers have tried to provide an alternative argument that, by accepting the semantic externalism approach, will succeed in rejecting skepticism about the external world. Nevertheless, these arguments are subject to further criticisms. In this paper, I attempt to develop some arguments to show that none of these externalist arguments succeed in rejecting skepticism. On the other hand, using the basic idea of skepticism in rejecting the possibility of acquiring knowledge, I suggest a new externalist argument on which basis it can be correctly claimed that skepticism is an untenable position.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_12004_fc2a3ca6d83896ea6815a99291fed52f.pdfskepticism about the external worldsemantic externalismepistemic circularityputnamskeptical hypothesis
spellingShingle Hamid Alaeinejad
Examining the Possibility of Refuting Philosophical Skepticism by Accepting Semantic Externalism
حکمت و فلسفه
skepticism about the external world
semantic externalism
epistemic circularity
putnam
skeptical hypothesis
title Examining the Possibility of Refuting Philosophical Skepticism by Accepting Semantic Externalism
title_full Examining the Possibility of Refuting Philosophical Skepticism by Accepting Semantic Externalism
title_fullStr Examining the Possibility of Refuting Philosophical Skepticism by Accepting Semantic Externalism
title_full_unstemmed Examining the Possibility of Refuting Philosophical Skepticism by Accepting Semantic Externalism
title_short Examining the Possibility of Refuting Philosophical Skepticism by Accepting Semantic Externalism
title_sort examining the possibility of refuting philosophical skepticism by accepting semantic externalism
topic skepticism about the external world
semantic externalism
epistemic circularity
putnam
skeptical hypothesis
url https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_12004_fc2a3ca6d83896ea6815a99291fed52f.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT hamidalaeinejad examiningthepossibilityofrefutingphilosophicalskepticismbyacceptingsemanticexternalism