Reconciling Locke’s Consciousness-based Theory of Personal Identity and his Soteriology
This article maintains that Locke’s consciousness-based theory of personal identity, which Locke expounded in book 2, chapter 27 of the second edition of An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1694), perfectly fits with his views on the resurrection of the dead, the Last Judgment, and salvation....
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Western Libraries, The University of Western Ontario
2020-06-01
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| Series: | Locke Studies |
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| Online Access: | https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/locke/article/view/7321 |
| _version_ | 1797978991240413184 |
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| author | Diego Lucci |
| author_facet | Diego Lucci |
| author_sort | Diego Lucci |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description |
This article maintains that Locke’s consciousness-based theory of personal identity, which Locke expounded in book 2, chapter 27 of the second edition of An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1694), perfectly fits with his views on the resurrection of the dead, the Last Judgment, and salvation. The compatibility of Locke’s theory of personal identity with his soteriology has been questioned by Udo Thiel and Galen Strawson. These two authors have claimed that Locke’s emphasis on repentance, which he described as necessary to salvation in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), clashes with his notion of punishment as annexed to personality and, hence, to consciousness. Pace Thiel and Strawson, I argue that Locke’s theory of personal identity is compatible with his concept of repentance. To this purpose, I first explain Locke’s views on the soul’s death and the resurrection of the dead on Judgment Day, when, according to Locke, we will all be raised from death by divine miracle, but only the repentant faithful will be admitted to eternal bliss while the wicked will be annihilated. Locke’s mortalism, along with his agnosticism on the ontological constitution of thinking substances or souls, played a role in his formulation of a non-substantialist account of personal identity, because it denied the temporal continuity of the soul between physical death and resurrection and it rejected the resurrection of the same body. I then analyze Locke’s consciousness-based theory of personal identity, with a focus on the implications of this theory regarding moral accountability. Finally, I turn my attention to Thiel’s and Strawson’s considerations about Locke’s views on consciousness and repentance. To prove that Locke’s views on salvation are consistent with his theory of personal identity, I clarify Locke’s soteriology, which describes not only repentance, but also obedience, faith, and the conscientious study of Scripture as necessary to salvation.
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| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T05:32:50Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-c71c6a3a81254795a409f43223815656 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2561-925X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T05:32:50Z |
| publishDate | 2020-06-01 |
| publisher | Western Libraries, The University of Western Ontario |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Locke Studies |
| spelling | doaj.art-c71c6a3a81254795a409f432238156562022-12-22T17:00:19ZengWestern Libraries, The University of Western OntarioLocke Studies2561-925X2020-06-012010.5206/ls.2020.7321Reconciling Locke’s Consciousness-based Theory of Personal Identity and his SoteriologyDiego Lucci This article maintains that Locke’s consciousness-based theory of personal identity, which Locke expounded in book 2, chapter 27 of the second edition of An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1694), perfectly fits with his views on the resurrection of the dead, the Last Judgment, and salvation. The compatibility of Locke’s theory of personal identity with his soteriology has been questioned by Udo Thiel and Galen Strawson. These two authors have claimed that Locke’s emphasis on repentance, which he described as necessary to salvation in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), clashes with his notion of punishment as annexed to personality and, hence, to consciousness. Pace Thiel and Strawson, I argue that Locke’s theory of personal identity is compatible with his concept of repentance. To this purpose, I first explain Locke’s views on the soul’s death and the resurrection of the dead on Judgment Day, when, according to Locke, we will all be raised from death by divine miracle, but only the repentant faithful will be admitted to eternal bliss while the wicked will be annihilated. Locke’s mortalism, along with his agnosticism on the ontological constitution of thinking substances or souls, played a role in his formulation of a non-substantialist account of personal identity, because it denied the temporal continuity of the soul between physical death and resurrection and it rejected the resurrection of the same body. I then analyze Locke’s consciousness-based theory of personal identity, with a focus on the implications of this theory regarding moral accountability. Finally, I turn my attention to Thiel’s and Strawson’s considerations about Locke’s views on consciousness and repentance. To prove that Locke’s views on salvation are consistent with his theory of personal identity, I clarify Locke’s soteriology, which describes not only repentance, but also obedience, faith, and the conscientious study of Scripture as necessary to salvation. https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/locke/article/view/7321ArminianismconsciousnessJohn LockeLast Judgmentmortalismpersonal identity |
| spellingShingle | Diego Lucci Reconciling Locke’s Consciousness-based Theory of Personal Identity and his Soteriology Locke Studies Arminianism consciousness John Locke Last Judgment mortalism personal identity |
| title | Reconciling Locke’s Consciousness-based Theory of Personal Identity and his Soteriology |
| title_full | Reconciling Locke’s Consciousness-based Theory of Personal Identity and his Soteriology |
| title_fullStr | Reconciling Locke’s Consciousness-based Theory of Personal Identity and his Soteriology |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reconciling Locke’s Consciousness-based Theory of Personal Identity and his Soteriology |
| title_short | Reconciling Locke’s Consciousness-based Theory of Personal Identity and his Soteriology |
| title_sort | reconciling locke s consciousness based theory of personal identity and his soteriology |
| topic | Arminianism consciousness John Locke Last Judgment mortalism personal identity |
| url | https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/locke/article/view/7321 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT diegolucci reconcilinglockesconsciousnessbasedtheoryofpersonalidentityandhissoteriology |