Against a Systemic Legal History

This paper questions the resort to systems theory as the foundation of an evolutionary legal history. In particular, the theoretical legacy of Niklas Luhmann upon which Marie Theres Fögen proposes to draw seems to have limited application outside a context in which advanced system differentiation is...

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Main Author: Simon Roberts
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory 2002-01-01
Series:Rechtsgeschichte - Legal History
Subjects:
Online Access:http://data.rg.mpg.de/rechtsgeschichte/rg01_debatte_roberts.pdf
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author Simon Roberts
author_facet Simon Roberts
author_sort Simon Roberts
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description This paper questions the resort to systems theory as the foundation of an evolutionary legal history. In particular, the theoretical legacy of Niklas Luhmann upon which Marie Theres Fögen proposes to draw seems to have limited application outside a context in which advanced system differentiation is present. Although (like Marx, Durkheim and Weber before him) Luhmann drew in a broad evolutionary trajectory, he was concerned principally with “functionally differentiated society”. Earlier phases – covering precisely those formations that historians will presumably focus upon – are very hazily sketched in and relatively poorly theorised. In general, we should not too readily acknowledge “the exhaustion of the paradigm of modernity” (Santos, 1995) or rush to proclaim the obsolescence of multi-dimensional approaches such as those of Bourdieu (1977) and Giddens (1984). Any legal history that marginalises both human actors and the conditional environment has a considerable task in making up the ensuing deficit.
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spelling doaj.art-c7777c8867e3449891f0659b40f3a1e82022-12-21T22:20:44ZdeuMax Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal TheoryRechtsgeschichte - Legal History1619-49932195-96172002-01-01Rg 01212510.12946/rg01/021-0252Against a Systemic Legal HistorySimon RobertsThis paper questions the resort to systems theory as the foundation of an evolutionary legal history. In particular, the theoretical legacy of Niklas Luhmann upon which Marie Theres Fögen proposes to draw seems to have limited application outside a context in which advanced system differentiation is present. Although (like Marx, Durkheim and Weber before him) Luhmann drew in a broad evolutionary trajectory, he was concerned principally with “functionally differentiated society”. Earlier phases – covering precisely those formations that historians will presumably focus upon – are very hazily sketched in and relatively poorly theorised. In general, we should not too readily acknowledge “the exhaustion of the paradigm of modernity” (Santos, 1995) or rush to proclaim the obsolescence of multi-dimensional approaches such as those of Bourdieu (1977) and Giddens (1984). Any legal history that marginalises both human actors and the conditional environment has a considerable task in making up the ensuing deficit.http://data.rg.mpg.de/rechtsgeschichte/rg01_debatte_roberts.pdfMPIeR
spellingShingle Simon Roberts
Against a Systemic Legal History
Rechtsgeschichte - Legal History
MPIeR
title Against a Systemic Legal History
title_full Against a Systemic Legal History
title_fullStr Against a Systemic Legal History
title_full_unstemmed Against a Systemic Legal History
title_short Against a Systemic Legal History
title_sort against a systemic legal history
topic MPIeR
url http://data.rg.mpg.de/rechtsgeschichte/rg01_debatte_roberts.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT simonroberts againstasystemiclegalhistory