In Defense of Weird Hypotheticals
Professor Allen (this issue) critiques the value of using “weird” hypotheticals to mine intuitions about legal systems. I respond by supporting the value of “thin” hypotheticals for providing information about how people reason generally, rather than for revealing peoples’ specific answers. I note t...
Main Author: | Barbara A Spellman |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Marcial Pons
2021-01-01
|
Series: | Quaestio Facti |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://revistes.udg.edu/quaestio-facti/article/view/22477 |
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