Practical Related-Key Forgery Attacks on Full-Round TinyJAMBU-192/256

TinyJAMBU is one of the finalists in the NIST lightweight cryptography competition. It is considered to be one of the more efficient ciphers in the competition and has undergone extensive analysis in recent years as both the keyed permutation as well as the mode are new designs. In this paper we pr...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Orr Dunkelman, Shibam Ghosh, Eran Lambooij
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2023-06-01
Series:IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/10982
_version_ 1797801933641089024
author Orr Dunkelman
Shibam Ghosh
Eran Lambooij
author_facet Orr Dunkelman
Shibam Ghosh
Eran Lambooij
author_sort Orr Dunkelman
collection DOAJ
description TinyJAMBU is one of the finalists in the NIST lightweight cryptography competition. It is considered to be one of the more efficient ciphers in the competition and has undergone extensive analysis in recent years as both the keyed permutation as well as the mode are new designs. In this paper we present a related-key forgery attack on the updated TinyJAMBU-v2 scheme with 256- and 192-bit keys. We introduce a high probability related-key differential attack where the differences are only introduced into the key state. Therefore, the characteristic is applicable to the TinyJAMBU mode and can be used to mount a forgery attack. The time and data complexity of the forgery are 233 using 214 related-keys for the 256-bit key version, and 243 using 216 related-keys for the 192-bit key version. For the 128-bit key we construct a related-key differential characteristic on the full keyed permutation of TinyJAMBU with a probability of 2−16. We extend the relatedkey differential characteristics on TinyJAMBU to practical-time key-recovery attacks that extract the full key from the keyed permutation with a time and data complexity of 224, 221, and 219 for respectively the 128-, 192-, and 256-bit key variants. All characteristics are experimentally verified and we provide key nonce pairs that produce the same tag to show the feasibility of the forgery attack. We note that the designers do not claim related-key security, however, the attacks proposed in this paper suggest that the scheme is not key-commiting, which has been recently identified as a favorable property for AEAD schemes.
first_indexed 2024-03-13T04:58:05Z
format Article
id doaj.art-c86d61690e2a4257b19865eec76b214e
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 2519-173X
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-13T04:58:05Z
publishDate 2023-06-01
publisher Ruhr-Universität Bochum
record_format Article
series IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
spelling doaj.art-c86d61690e2a4257b19865eec76b214e2023-06-17T15:51:15ZengRuhr-Universität BochumIACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology2519-173X2023-06-012023210.46586/tosc.v2023.i2.176-188Practical Related-Key Forgery Attacks on Full-Round TinyJAMBU-192/256Orr Dunkelman0Shibam Ghosh1Eran Lambooij2Department of Computer Science, University Of Haifa, Haifa, IsraelDepartment of Computer Science, University Of Haifa, Haifa, IsraelDepartment of Computer Science, University Of Haifa, Haifa, Israel TinyJAMBU is one of the finalists in the NIST lightweight cryptography competition. It is considered to be one of the more efficient ciphers in the competition and has undergone extensive analysis in recent years as both the keyed permutation as well as the mode are new designs. In this paper we present a related-key forgery attack on the updated TinyJAMBU-v2 scheme with 256- and 192-bit keys. We introduce a high probability related-key differential attack where the differences are only introduced into the key state. Therefore, the characteristic is applicable to the TinyJAMBU mode and can be used to mount a forgery attack. The time and data complexity of the forgery are 233 using 214 related-keys for the 256-bit key version, and 243 using 216 related-keys for the 192-bit key version. For the 128-bit key we construct a related-key differential characteristic on the full keyed permutation of TinyJAMBU with a probability of 2−16. We extend the relatedkey differential characteristics on TinyJAMBU to practical-time key-recovery attacks that extract the full key from the keyed permutation with a time and data complexity of 224, 221, and 219 for respectively the 128-, 192-, and 256-bit key variants. All characteristics are experimentally verified and we provide key nonce pairs that produce the same tag to show the feasibility of the forgery attack. We note that the designers do not claim related-key security, however, the attacks proposed in this paper suggest that the scheme is not key-commiting, which has been recently identified as a favorable property for AEAD schemes. https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/10982TinyJAMBUDifferential cryptanalysisRelated-KeyForgeryNIST-LWC
spellingShingle Orr Dunkelman
Shibam Ghosh
Eran Lambooij
Practical Related-Key Forgery Attacks on Full-Round TinyJAMBU-192/256
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
TinyJAMBU
Differential cryptanalysis
Related-Key
Forgery
NIST-LWC
title Practical Related-Key Forgery Attacks on Full-Round TinyJAMBU-192/256
title_full Practical Related-Key Forgery Attacks on Full-Round TinyJAMBU-192/256
title_fullStr Practical Related-Key Forgery Attacks on Full-Round TinyJAMBU-192/256
title_full_unstemmed Practical Related-Key Forgery Attacks on Full-Round TinyJAMBU-192/256
title_short Practical Related-Key Forgery Attacks on Full-Round TinyJAMBU-192/256
title_sort practical related key forgery attacks on full round tinyjambu 192 256
topic TinyJAMBU
Differential cryptanalysis
Related-Key
Forgery
NIST-LWC
url https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/10982
work_keys_str_mv AT orrdunkelman practicalrelatedkeyforgeryattacksonfullroundtinyjambu192256
AT shibamghosh practicalrelatedkeyforgeryattacksonfullroundtinyjambu192256
AT eranlambooij practicalrelatedkeyforgeryattacksonfullroundtinyjambu192256