Effect of Horizontal-Agency-Costs and Managerial Ownership on Monitoring Mechanisms

Effect of Horizontal-Agency-Costs and Managerial Ownership on Monitoring Mechanisms

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There is a level of information asymmetry between the agents (management and the board of directors) and the principal (shareholders) in every company. The purpose of this study is to examine the scope of monitoring mechanisms in non-financial listed companies of Nigeria. This paper also investigat...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Rachael Oluyemisi Arowolo, Ayoib Che-Ahmad
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: EconJournals 2016-10-01
Series:International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues
Subjects:
monitoring mechanisms
horizontal-agency-costs
managerial ownership
Online Access:https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ijefi/issue/32000/353057?publisher=http-www-cag-edu-tr-ilhan-ozturk
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