Aristotle on Dividing the Soul
Aristotle’s account of the soul requires an adequate division of the soul. However, Aristotle refuses to divide the soul spatially, and insists that it is divided only conceptually, that is ‘in being’ or ‘in account’. In this paper I explain what this division amounts to and how Aristotle executes i...
Main Author: | Pavel Gregoric |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Society for the Advancement of Philosophy
2008-11-01
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Series: | Prolegomena |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=45934&lang=en |
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