Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities

This short paper shows the interdependence of taxation and monitoring policy in a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment with an underground sector. More precisely, from a social welfare standpoint, two options are available to the policy maker: she/he may either substitute a tighter...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gaetano LISI
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi 2011-06-01
Series:Eastern Journal of European Studies
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2011_0201_LIS.pdf
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author Gaetano LISI
author_facet Gaetano LISI
author_sort Gaetano LISI
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description This short paper shows the interdependence of taxation and monitoring policy in a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment with an underground sector. More precisely, from a social welfare standpoint, two options are available to the policy maker: she/he may either substitute a tighter monitoring with a higher penalty or enforce both a higher taxation and an increased monitoring.
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spelling doaj.art-c9ae0bcabb0d4554bbd03877299ff8282022-12-21T19:51:59ZengAlexandru Ioan Cuza University of IasiEastern Journal of European Studies2068-651X2068-66332011-06-0121511Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activitiesGaetano LISIThis short paper shows the interdependence of taxation and monitoring policy in a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment with an underground sector. More precisely, from a social welfare standpoint, two options are available to the policy maker: she/he may either substitute a tighter monitoring with a higher penalty or enforce both a higher taxation and an increased monitoring.http://www.ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2011_0201_LIS.pdfoptimal taxationtax evasionunderground economyjob search
spellingShingle Gaetano LISI
Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities
Eastern Journal of European Studies
optimal taxation
tax evasion
underground economy
job search
title Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities
title_full Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities
title_fullStr Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities
title_full_unstemmed Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities
title_short Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities
title_sort optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities
topic optimal taxation
tax evasion
underground economy
job search
url http://www.ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2011_0201_LIS.pdf
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