Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities
This short paper shows the interdependence of taxation and monitoring policy in a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment with an underground sector. More precisely, from a social welfare standpoint, two options are available to the policy maker: she/he may either substitute a tighter...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi
2011-06-01
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Series: | Eastern Journal of European Studies |
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Online Access: | http://www.ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2011_0201_LIS.pdf |
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author | Gaetano LISI |
author_facet | Gaetano LISI |
author_sort | Gaetano LISI |
collection | DOAJ |
description | This short paper shows the interdependence of taxation and monitoring policy in a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment with an underground sector. More precisely, from a social welfare standpoint, two options are available to the policy maker: she/he may either substitute a tighter monitoring with a higher penalty or enforce both a higher taxation and an increased monitoring. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-20T05:22:08Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-c9ae0bcabb0d4554bbd03877299ff828 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2068-651X 2068-6633 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-20T05:22:08Z |
publishDate | 2011-06-01 |
publisher | Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi |
record_format | Article |
series | Eastern Journal of European Studies |
spelling | doaj.art-c9ae0bcabb0d4554bbd03877299ff8282022-12-21T19:51:59ZengAlexandru Ioan Cuza University of IasiEastern Journal of European Studies2068-651X2068-66332011-06-0121511Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activitiesGaetano LISIThis short paper shows the interdependence of taxation and monitoring policy in a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment with an underground sector. More precisely, from a social welfare standpoint, two options are available to the policy maker: she/he may either substitute a tighter monitoring with a higher penalty or enforce both a higher taxation and an increased monitoring.http://www.ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2011_0201_LIS.pdfoptimal taxationtax evasionunderground economyjob search |
spellingShingle | Gaetano LISI Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities Eastern Journal of European Studies optimal taxation tax evasion underground economy job search |
title | Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities |
title_full | Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities |
title_fullStr | Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities |
title_full_unstemmed | Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities |
title_short | Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities |
title_sort | optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities |
topic | optimal taxation tax evasion underground economy job search |
url | http://www.ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2011_0201_LIS.pdf |
work_keys_str_mv | AT gaetanolisi optimaltaxationandmonitoringinaneconomywithmatchingfrictionsandundergroundactivities |