Stanley Cavell’s Argument of the Ordinary
My overall aim is to show that there is a serious and compelling argument in Stanley Cavell’s work for why any philosophical theorizing that fails to recognize what Cavell refers to as “our common world of background” as a condition for the sense of anything we say or do, and to acknowledge its own...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Nordic Wittgenstein Society
2018-12-01
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| Series: | Nordic Wittgenstein Review |
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| Online Access: | https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3521 |
| _version_ | 1818270192727228416 |
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| author | Avner Baz |
| author_facet | Avner Baz |
| author_sort | Avner Baz |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | My overall aim is to show that there is a serious and compelling argument in Stanley Cavell’s work for why any philosophical theorizing that fails to recognize what Cavell refers to as “our common world of background” as a condition for the sense of anything we say or do, and to acknowledge its own dependence on that background and the vulnerability implied by that dependence, runs the risk of rendering itself, thereby, ultimately unintelligible. I begin with a characterization of Cavell’s unique way of inheriting Austin and Wittgenstein – I call it “ordinary language philosophy existentialism” – as it relates to what Cavell calls “skepticism”. I then turn to Cavell’s response to Kripke in “The Argument of the Ordinary”, which is different from all other responses to Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language in that Cavell’s response, while theoretically powerful, is at the same time also existentialist, in the sense that Cavell finds a way of acknowledging in his writing the fundamental fact that his writing (thinking) constitutes an instance of what he is writing (thinking) about. This unique achievement of Cavell’s response to Kripke is not additional to his argument, but essential to it: it enables him not merely to say, but to show that, and how, Kripke’s account falsifies what it purports to elucidate, and thereby to show that the theoretical question of linguistic sense is not truly separable, not even theoretically, from the broadly ethical question of how we relate to others, and how we conduct ourselves in relation to them from one moment to the next. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-12T21:06:23Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-c9deea4a41ab4b919d130431ed61efb2 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2194-6825 2242-248X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-12T21:06:23Z |
| publishDate | 2018-12-01 |
| publisher | Nordic Wittgenstein Society |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Nordic Wittgenstein Review |
| spelling | doaj.art-c9deea4a41ab4b919d130431ed61efb22022-12-22T00:11:59ZengNordic Wittgenstein SocietyNordic Wittgenstein Review2194-68252242-248X2018-12-017210.15845/nwr.v7i2.3521Stanley Cavell’s Argument of the OrdinaryAvner Baz0Tufts UniversityMy overall aim is to show that there is a serious and compelling argument in Stanley Cavell’s work for why any philosophical theorizing that fails to recognize what Cavell refers to as “our common world of background” as a condition for the sense of anything we say or do, and to acknowledge its own dependence on that background and the vulnerability implied by that dependence, runs the risk of rendering itself, thereby, ultimately unintelligible. I begin with a characterization of Cavell’s unique way of inheriting Austin and Wittgenstein – I call it “ordinary language philosophy existentialism” – as it relates to what Cavell calls “skepticism”. I then turn to Cavell’s response to Kripke in “The Argument of the Ordinary”, which is different from all other responses to Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language in that Cavell’s response, while theoretically powerful, is at the same time also existentialist, in the sense that Cavell finds a way of acknowledging in his writing the fundamental fact that his writing (thinking) constitutes an instance of what he is writing (thinking) about. This unique achievement of Cavell’s response to Kripke is not additional to his argument, but essential to it: it enables him not merely to say, but to show that, and how, Kripke’s account falsifies what it purports to elucidate, and thereby to show that the theoretical question of linguistic sense is not truly separable, not even theoretically, from the broadly ethical question of how we relate to others, and how we conduct ourselves in relation to them from one moment to the next.https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3521CavellWittgensteinAustinordinary language philosophyskepticismKripke |
| spellingShingle | Avner Baz Stanley Cavell’s Argument of the Ordinary Nordic Wittgenstein Review Cavell Wittgenstein Austin ordinary language philosophy skepticism Kripke |
| title | Stanley Cavell’s Argument of the Ordinary |
| title_full | Stanley Cavell’s Argument of the Ordinary |
| title_fullStr | Stanley Cavell’s Argument of the Ordinary |
| title_full_unstemmed | Stanley Cavell’s Argument of the Ordinary |
| title_short | Stanley Cavell’s Argument of the Ordinary |
| title_sort | stanley cavell s argument of the ordinary |
| topic | Cavell Wittgenstein Austin ordinary language philosophy skepticism Kripke |
| url | https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3521 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT avnerbaz stanleycavellsargumentoftheordinary |