Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking
Contractual incompleteness is essentially related to the “unverifiability” condition and “enforceability” condition. In the complex and uncertain economic environment, financial contract is incomplete. Contractual incompleteness decrease contract effectiveness. We analyze banking contracts with resp...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fas |
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پژوهشگاه حوزه و دانشگاه
2020-09-01
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| Series: | جستارهای اقتصادی |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://iee.rihu.ac.ir/article_1783_bf0de2692c3c8c9ef5383f7375386ba3.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797294098752733184 |
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| author | Kamran Nadri Mohammad Mahdi Askari mohamad hadi zahedi vafa ali mostafavisani |
| author_facet | Kamran Nadri Mohammad Mahdi Askari mohamad hadi zahedi vafa ali mostafavisani |
| author_sort | Kamran Nadri |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Contractual incompleteness is essentially related to the “unverifiability” condition and “enforceability” condition. In the complex and uncertain economic environment, financial contract is incomplete. Contractual incompleteness decrease contract effectiveness. We analyze banking contracts with respect to incomplete contract theory. The results show that the banking contracts in Iran are incomplete. Because of high transaction cost, uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity and unenforceable contract, lead not to perfect implementation of commitment. The fact that contracts are incomplete allows for opportunistic behavior of entrepreneur and hold-up bank inside credit contract. Some mechanisms needed for gap filling in incomplete contract. In banking contract this mechanism is designed in relationship banking that help to balanced bargaining power between parties and can reduce problems caused by Contractual incompleteness. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T21:25:15Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ca7b59717be44b5c82bf805fae035a5e |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1735-3300 2588-5812 |
| language | fas |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T21:25:15Z |
| publishDate | 2020-09-01 |
| publisher | پژوهشگاه حوزه و دانشگاه |
| record_format | Article |
| series | جستارهای اقتصادی |
| spelling | doaj.art-ca7b59717be44b5c82bf805fae035a5e2024-02-27T06:49:27Zfasپژوهشگاه حوزه و دانشگاهجستارهای اقتصادی1735-33002588-58122020-09-01173493510.30471/iee.2020.6256.18801783Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest bankingKamran Nadri0Mohammad Mahdi Askari1mohamad hadi zahedi vafa2ali mostafavisani3Professor of Economics at Imam Sadiq University (ISU)imam sadiq universityimam sadiq universityimam sadiq universityContractual incompleteness is essentially related to the “unverifiability” condition and “enforceability” condition. In the complex and uncertain economic environment, financial contract is incomplete. Contractual incompleteness decrease contract effectiveness. We analyze banking contracts with respect to incomplete contract theory. The results show that the banking contracts in Iran are incomplete. Because of high transaction cost, uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity and unenforceable contract, lead not to perfect implementation of commitment. The fact that contracts are incomplete allows for opportunistic behavior of entrepreneur and hold-up bank inside credit contract. Some mechanisms needed for gap filling in incomplete contract. In banking contract this mechanism is designed in relationship banking that help to balanced bargaining power between parties and can reduce problems caused by Contractual incompleteness.https://iee.rihu.ac.ir/article_1783_bf0de2692c3c8c9ef5383f7375386ba3.pdfincomplete contracthold-up problemopportunistic behaviorbanking contractrelationship banking |
| spellingShingle | Kamran Nadri Mohammad Mahdi Askari mohamad hadi zahedi vafa ali mostafavisani Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking جستارهای اقتصادی incomplete contract hold-up problem opportunistic behavior banking contract relationship banking |
| title | Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking |
| title_full | Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking |
| title_fullStr | Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking |
| title_short | Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking |
| title_sort | optimization of banking contract structure based on incomplete contracting in non interest banking |
| topic | incomplete contract hold-up problem opportunistic behavior banking contract relationship banking |
| url | https://iee.rihu.ac.ir/article_1783_bf0de2692c3c8c9ef5383f7375386ba3.pdf |
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