The Risk-sensitivity of Bank Capital Requirements: The Moderating Effects of Capital Regulation and Supervisory Power

This study examines the moderating effects of capital regulation and supervisory power on the risk-sensitivity of bank capital requirements. Using two-step system GMM estimator, we work on the international sample of 222 banks charted in 30 countries. The finding suggests that asset volatility is a...

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Main Authors: Mohamed Albaity, Mohammadmahdi Toobaee
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: EconJournals 2017-04-01
Series:International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues
Online Access:http://mail.econjournals.com/index.php/ijefi/article/view/4039
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author Mohamed Albaity
Mohammadmahdi Toobaee
author_facet Mohamed Albaity
Mohammadmahdi Toobaee
author_sort Mohamed Albaity
collection DOAJ
description This study examines the moderating effects of capital regulation and supervisory power on the risk-sensitivity of bank capital requirements. Using two-step system GMM estimator, we work on the international sample of 222 banks charted in 30 countries. The finding suggests that asset volatility is a critical variable in explaining the risk-sensitivity of banks. The results indicate that stricter capital regulatory regimes and higher supervisory power enhance the risk sensitivity of capital requirements. Moreover, the capital regulation was found to moderate the relationship between asset volatility and risk-sensitivity while supervisory power was found not to exert any impact on the level of risk of the banks. Another interesting result is that governments with a higher debt to GDP ratio tend to overregulate the other banks' investments compared to government bonds. This is the first study that investigates the moderating effects of capital regulation and power of supervision on the risk sensitivity of capital requirements. The results of this study show that the efficiency of risk-based capital requirements depends on the stringency of capital regulation in different countries. Keywords: bank capital requirements, risk-weighted assets, capital regulation, supervisory power, system GMM, government debt to GDP. JEL Classifications: G21, G34, G33, G28
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spelling doaj.art-ca93c9dde3cc4ea2b14fe5f2add850f42023-02-15T16:09:52ZengEconJournalsInternational Journal of Economics and Financial Issues2146-41382017-04-0172The Risk-sensitivity of Bank Capital Requirements: The Moderating Effects of Capital Regulation and Supervisory PowerMohamed Albaity0Mohammadmahdi Toobaee1Assistant professor Department of Finance and Economics, College of business administration University of Sharjah, Sharjah, 27272, UAE malbaity@sharjah.ac.aeDepartment of banking and finance Faculty of business and accountancy University of Malaya Kuala Lumpur 50603 Malaysia This study examines the moderating effects of capital regulation and supervisory power on the risk-sensitivity of bank capital requirements. Using two-step system GMM estimator, we work on the international sample of 222 banks charted in 30 countries. The finding suggests that asset volatility is a critical variable in explaining the risk-sensitivity of banks. The results indicate that stricter capital regulatory regimes and higher supervisory power enhance the risk sensitivity of capital requirements. Moreover, the capital regulation was found to moderate the relationship between asset volatility and risk-sensitivity while supervisory power was found not to exert any impact on the level of risk of the banks. Another interesting result is that governments with a higher debt to GDP ratio tend to overregulate the other banks' investments compared to government bonds. This is the first study that investigates the moderating effects of capital regulation and power of supervision on the risk sensitivity of capital requirements. The results of this study show that the efficiency of risk-based capital requirements depends on the stringency of capital regulation in different countries. Keywords: bank capital requirements, risk-weighted assets, capital regulation, supervisory power, system GMM, government debt to GDP. JEL Classifications: G21, G34, G33, G28 http://mail.econjournals.com/index.php/ijefi/article/view/4039
spellingShingle Mohamed Albaity
Mohammadmahdi Toobaee
The Risk-sensitivity of Bank Capital Requirements: The Moderating Effects of Capital Regulation and Supervisory Power
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues
title The Risk-sensitivity of Bank Capital Requirements: The Moderating Effects of Capital Regulation and Supervisory Power
title_full The Risk-sensitivity of Bank Capital Requirements: The Moderating Effects of Capital Regulation and Supervisory Power
title_fullStr The Risk-sensitivity of Bank Capital Requirements: The Moderating Effects of Capital Regulation and Supervisory Power
title_full_unstemmed The Risk-sensitivity of Bank Capital Requirements: The Moderating Effects of Capital Regulation and Supervisory Power
title_short The Risk-sensitivity of Bank Capital Requirements: The Moderating Effects of Capital Regulation and Supervisory Power
title_sort risk sensitivity of bank capital requirements the moderating effects of capital regulation and supervisory power
url http://mail.econjournals.com/index.php/ijefi/article/view/4039
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