The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge

The Fodorian central objections to Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) can be taken to include an ‘Analyticity Challenge’ and a ‘Circularity Challenge’, which are ultimately challenges to IRS explanations of concept possession. In this paper I present inferential role theories, critically examine these...

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Main Author: Víctor M. Verdejo
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of the Basque Country 2013-02-01
Series:Theoria
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/1881
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author Víctor M. Verdejo
author_facet Víctor M. Verdejo
author_sort Víctor M. Verdejo
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description The Fodorian central objections to Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) can be taken to include an ‘Analyticity Challenge’ and a ‘Circularity Challenge’, which are ultimately challenges to IRS explanations of concept possession. In this paper I present inferential role theories, critically examine these challenges and point out two misunderstandings to which they are exposed. I then state in detail a rationalist version of IRS and argue that this version meets head on the Fodorian challenges. If sound, these considerations show that there is no problem of principle in the consideration of IRS as a good candidate for a theory of concepts.
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spelling doaj.art-cab8eb8590ef4bb29fe919c759085da42022-12-22T02:47:52ZengUniversity of the Basque CountryTheoria0495-45482171-679X2013-02-0128172510.1387/theoria.18815809The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity ChallengeVíctor M. Verdejo0Universidad Autónoma de MadridThe Fodorian central objections to Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) can be taken to include an ‘Analyticity Challenge’ and a ‘Circularity Challenge’, which are ultimately challenges to IRS explanations of concept possession. In this paper I present inferential role theories, critically examine these challenges and point out two misunderstandings to which they are exposed. I then state in detail a rationalist version of IRS and argue that this version meets head on the Fodorian challenges. If sound, these considerations show that there is no problem of principle in the consideration of IRS as a good candidate for a theory of concepts.http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/1881AnalyticityTheoretical CircularityRationalist IRSComplete Frege Test
spellingShingle Víctor M. Verdejo
The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge
Theoria
Analyticity
Theoretical Circularity
Rationalist IRS
Complete Frege Test
title The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge
title_full The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge
title_fullStr The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge
title_full_unstemmed The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge
title_short The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge
title_sort rationalist reply to fodor s analyticity and circularity challenge
topic Analyticity
Theoretical Circularity
Rationalist IRS
Complete Frege Test
url http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/1881
work_keys_str_mv AT victormverdejo therationalistreplytofodorsanalyticityandcircularitychallenge
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