Summary: | This paper aims at shedding light on a thesis, which appears not to be fully and systematically developed in Reinhardt’s
book: the thesis that Kant stands in the way of the main streams of contemporary philosophical-political debate, insofar
as his legal-political philosophy allows for a fundamental questioning of the nexus between private property,
sovereignty and the right of exclusion. To this end, one will firstly show how Reinhardt interprets the articulation
between the three terms - land ownership, sovereignty, and the right of exclusion - by collecting the references to this
subject scattered throughout her book (§1). On the basis of this reconstruction, the essay will critically focus on two
points: on the one hand, the nexus between private land ownership and "public space" (§ 2); on the other hand, the
status of "provisional possession" in Kantian legal philosophy (§ 3).
In conclusion, one will summon up the results of the analysis in order to put forward the distinctive features of Kant’s
deduction of property rights which allows to critically rethink the triad ownership/ sovereignty and exclusion.
|