Dose the Conceptual Interdependency of Belief and Desire Undermine the Normativity of Content?
The normativity of mental content thesis appears to have been the most influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. Paul Boghossian (2003, 2005) has developed an argument for the normativity of mental content on the basis of two premises, i.e. firstly, the normativity of the notion of belief and...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages
2015-12-01
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| Series: | Journal of Philosophical Investigations |
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| Online Access: | http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_4698_635.html |
| Summary: | The normativity of mental content thesis appears to have been the most influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. Paul Boghossian (2003, 2005) has developed an argument for the normativity of mental content on the basis of two premises, i.e. firstly, the normativity of the notion of belief and secondly, the priority of the notion of belief to the notion of desire. In his recent article Alexander Miller (2008) has criticised Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of mental content. To make the objection against the normativity of content, Miller has argued that the second premise of Boghossian’s argument is since belief and desire are conceptually interdependent. My purpose in this paper is to show that content normativity thesis prevails Miller's attack. In order to establish the claim I will argue that content is normative even if belief and desire are conceptually interdependent. |
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| ISSN: | 2251-7960 2423-4419 |