Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule
We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the p...
Main Authors: | Yukihiko Funaki, Jiawen Li, Róbert F. Veszteg |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2017-12-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/4/52 |
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