Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing

Affordable housing lotteries often enforce a rule preventing duplicate lottery entries that makes the model in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) (HZ) inapplicable. We revisit HZ and propose a new individually stable (IS) allocation that can be achieved by a Tickets algorithm and accommodate the rule. A...

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Main Authors: Zhan Wang, Jinpeng Ma, Hongwei Zhang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design 2023-12-01
Series:Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
Subjects:
Online Access: http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v008-1/p_01.pdf
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author Zhan Wang
Jinpeng Ma
Hongwei Zhang
author_facet Zhan Wang
Jinpeng Ma
Hongwei Zhang
author_sort Zhan Wang
collection DOAJ
description Affordable housing lotteries often enforce a rule preventing duplicate lottery entries that makes the model in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) (HZ) inapplicable. We revisit HZ and propose a new individually stable (IS) allocation that can be achieved by a Tickets algorithm and accommodate the rule. A strictly envy-free (SEF) allocation is shown to be the unique IS and Pareto-optimal allocation, the outcome of the unique strong Nash equilibrium of a congestion game, and the unique Pseudo market equilibrium allocation in HZ. The algorithm always obtains the unique SEF allocation (if any) and fixes a designed flaw of existing lotteries.
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spelling doaj.art-cce5528a1bae4f129a76901feb4f33a82023-12-26T08:27:26ZengSociety for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution DesignJournal of Mechanism and Institution Design2399-844X2399-84582023-12-018115510.22574/jmid.2023.12.001jmi-v8i1a1Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housingZhan Wang0Jinpeng Ma1Hongwei Zhang2 Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China Rutgers University-Camden, USA Sichuan University, China Affordable housing lotteries often enforce a rule preventing duplicate lottery entries that makes the model in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) (HZ) inapplicable. We revisit HZ and propose a new individually stable (IS) allocation that can be achieved by a Tickets algorithm and accommodate the rule. A strictly envy-free (SEF) allocation is shown to be the unique IS and Pareto-optimal allocation, the outcome of the unique strong Nash equilibrium of a congestion game, and the unique Pseudo market equilibrium allocation in HZ. The algorithm always obtains the unique SEF allocation (if any) and fixes a designed flaw of existing lotteries. http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v008-1/p_01.pdf affordable housinglottery allocationstickets algorithm
spellingShingle Zhan Wang
Jinpeng Ma
Hongwei Zhang
Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
affordable housing
lottery allocations
tickets algorithm
title Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing
title_full Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing
title_fullStr Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing
title_full_unstemmed Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing
title_short Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing
title_sort stable and envy free lottery allocations for affordable housing
topic affordable housing
lottery allocations
tickets algorithm
url http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v008-1/p_01.pdf
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