Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing
Affordable housing lotteries often enforce a rule preventing duplicate lottery entries that makes the model in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) (HZ) inapplicable. We revisit HZ and propose a new individually stable (IS) allocation that can be achieved by a Tickets algorithm and accommodate the rule. A...
| Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | , , |
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| Μορφή: | Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design
2023-12-01
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| Σειρά: | Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v008-1/p_01.pdf
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