God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds
According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom req...
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Format: | Article |
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MDPI AG
2021-04-01
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Series: | Religions |
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Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/4/266 |
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author | Cheryl K. Chen |
author_facet | Cheryl K. Chen |
author_sort | Cheryl K. Chen |
collection | DOAJ |
description | According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all. |
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format | Article |
id | doaj.art-ccec6db2233142ac9bec581d3461004e |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2077-1444 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-10T12:25:28Z |
publishDate | 2021-04-01 |
publisher | MDPI AG |
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series | Religions |
spelling | doaj.art-ccec6db2233142ac9bec581d3461004e2023-11-21T15:07:45ZengMDPI AGReligions2077-14442021-04-0112426610.3390/rel12040266God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better WorldsCheryl K. Chen0Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USAAccording to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all.https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/4/266problem of evilfree will defenseAlvin PlantingaDavid LewisJames SterbaMolinism |
spellingShingle | Cheryl K. Chen God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds Religions problem of evil free will defense Alvin Plantinga David Lewis James Sterba Molinism |
title | God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds |
title_full | God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds |
title_fullStr | God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds |
title_full_unstemmed | God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds |
title_short | God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds |
title_sort | god and the playpen on the feasibility of morally better worlds |
topic | problem of evil free will defense Alvin Plantinga David Lewis James Sterba Molinism |
url | https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/4/266 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT cherylkchen godandtheplaypenonthefeasibilityofmorallybetterworlds |