The political economy of Kazakhstan: A case of good economics, bad politics?
Can autocracies and their associated institutions successfully implement economic policies that promote growth and investment? Can “good economics” somehow offset the effects of “bad” politics? Kazakhstan is a case where an autocratic regime has actively projected market-friendly policies and attrac...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Voprosy Ekonomiki
2022-07-01
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| Series: | Russian Journal of Economics |
| Online Access: | https://rujec.org/article/90948/download/pdf/ |
| _version_ | 1811222321584668672 |
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| author | Simon Commander Ruta Prieskienyte |
| author_facet | Simon Commander Ruta Prieskienyte |
| author_sort | Simon Commander |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Can autocracies and their associated institutions successfully implement economic policies that promote growth and investment? Can “good economics” somehow offset the effects of “bad” politics? Kazakhstan is a case where an autocratic regime has actively projected market-friendly policies and attracted significant amounts of incoming investment. These policies are to some extent reflected in the country’s governance ratings, although there has been a significant amount of investment disputes that question the attachment to the rule of law. Moreover, the political regime has remained strongly personalized around the founder President, his family and associates. This is reflected in the economics of the autocracy whereby a large public sector and a set of privately held businesses coexist to mutual benefit. The latter have been formed around a very small number of highly connected individuals whose initial accumulation of assets allows them also to act as necessary gatekeepers for entrants. Competition as a result remains limited in both economic and political domains. Yet, uncertainties over the future leadership, along with latent rivalry over access to resources and markets, make the political equilibrium quite fragile, as the events of January 2022 have underlined. In short, “bad” politics both squeezes the space for, and distorts the benefits from, “good” economics. At the same time, the limits of “good” economics are reflected in the extraordinary concentrations of ownership, control and wealth that have occurred. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T08:13:47Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-cd92a393670342149ea790eb85d092d6 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2405-4739 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T08:13:47Z |
| publishDate | 2022-07-01 |
| publisher | Voprosy Ekonomiki |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Russian Journal of Economics |
| spelling | doaj.art-cd92a393670342149ea790eb85d092d62022-12-22T03:40:54ZengVoprosy EkonomikiRussian Journal of Economics2405-47392022-07-018212215810.32609/j.ruje.8.9094890948The political economy of Kazakhstan: A case of good economics, bad politics?Simon Commander0Ruta Prieskienyte1IZAUniversity College LondonCan autocracies and their associated institutions successfully implement economic policies that promote growth and investment? Can “good economics” somehow offset the effects of “bad” politics? Kazakhstan is a case where an autocratic regime has actively projected market-friendly policies and attracted significant amounts of incoming investment. These policies are to some extent reflected in the country’s governance ratings, although there has been a significant amount of investment disputes that question the attachment to the rule of law. Moreover, the political regime has remained strongly personalized around the founder President, his family and associates. This is reflected in the economics of the autocracy whereby a large public sector and a set of privately held businesses coexist to mutual benefit. The latter have been formed around a very small number of highly connected individuals whose initial accumulation of assets allows them also to act as necessary gatekeepers for entrants. Competition as a result remains limited in both economic and political domains. Yet, uncertainties over the future leadership, along with latent rivalry over access to resources and markets, make the political equilibrium quite fragile, as the events of January 2022 have underlined. In short, “bad” politics both squeezes the space for, and distorts the benefits from, “good” economics. At the same time, the limits of “good” economics are reflected in the extraordinary concentrations of ownership, control and wealth that have occurred.https://rujec.org/article/90948/download/pdf/ |
| spellingShingle | Simon Commander Ruta Prieskienyte The political economy of Kazakhstan: A case of good economics, bad politics? Russian Journal of Economics |
| title | The political economy of Kazakhstan: A case of good economics, bad politics? |
| title_full | The political economy of Kazakhstan: A case of good economics, bad politics? |
| title_fullStr | The political economy of Kazakhstan: A case of good economics, bad politics? |
| title_full_unstemmed | The political economy of Kazakhstan: A case of good economics, bad politics? |
| title_short | The political economy of Kazakhstan: A case of good economics, bad politics? |
| title_sort | political economy of kazakhstan a case of good economics bad politics |
| url | https://rujec.org/article/90948/download/pdf/ |
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