Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma
Deliberate deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage is commonplace in human and animal societies. In a social dilemma, an individual may only pretend to be a cooperator to elicit cooperation from others, while in reality he is a defector. With this as motivation, we study a simple variant of the...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IOP Publishing
2014-01-01
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| Series: | New Journal of Physics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/16/11/113003 |
| _version_ | 1797751539333332992 |
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| author | Attila Szolnoki Matjaž Perc |
| author_facet | Attila Szolnoki Matjaž Perc |
| author_sort | Attila Szolnoki |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Deliberate deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage is commonplace in human and animal societies. In a social dilemma, an individual may only pretend to be a cooperator to elicit cooperation from others, while in reality he is a defector. With this as motivation, we study a simple variant of the evolutionary prisonerʼs dilemma game entailing deceitful defectors and conditional cooperators that lifts the veil on the impact of such two-faced behavior. Defectors are able to hide their true intentions at a personal cost, while conditional cooperators are probabilistically successful at identifying defectors and act accordingly. By focusing on the evolutionary outcomes in structured populations, we observe a number of unexpected and counterintuitive phenomena. We show that deceitful behavior may fare better if it is costly, and that a higher success rate of identifying defectors does not necessarily favor cooperative behavior. These results are rooted in the spontaneous emergence of cycling dominance and spatial patterns that give rise to fascinating phase transitions, which in turn reveal the hidden complexity behind the evolution of deception. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:51:00Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-cdffdfeddb204b0db2f1550c50a4df42 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1367-2630 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:51:00Z |
| publishDate | 2014-01-01 |
| publisher | IOP Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | New Journal of Physics |
| spelling | doaj.art-cdffdfeddb204b0db2f1550c50a4df422023-08-08T11:21:27ZengIOP PublishingNew Journal of Physics1367-26302014-01-01161111300310.1088/1367-2630/16/11/113003Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemmaAttila Szolnoki0Matjaž Perc1Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, PO Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, HungaryDepartment of Physics, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia; Department of Physics, Faculty of Science, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi ArabiaDeliberate deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage is commonplace in human and animal societies. In a social dilemma, an individual may only pretend to be a cooperator to elicit cooperation from others, while in reality he is a defector. With this as motivation, we study a simple variant of the evolutionary prisonerʼs dilemma game entailing deceitful defectors and conditional cooperators that lifts the veil on the impact of such two-faced behavior. Defectors are able to hide their true intentions at a personal cost, while conditional cooperators are probabilistically successful at identifying defectors and act accordingly. By focusing on the evolutionary outcomes in structured populations, we observe a number of unexpected and counterintuitive phenomena. We show that deceitful behavior may fare better if it is costly, and that a higher success rate of identifying defectors does not necessarily favor cooperative behavior. These results are rooted in the spontaneous emergence of cycling dominance and spatial patterns that give rise to fascinating phase transitions, which in turn reveal the hidden complexity behind the evolution of deception.https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/16/11/113003cooperationprisonerʼs dilemmaphase transition87.23.Ge89.75.Fb89.65.-s |
| spellingShingle | Attila Szolnoki Matjaž Perc Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma New Journal of Physics cooperation prisonerʼs dilemma phase transition 87.23.Ge 89.75.Fb 89.65.-s |
| title | Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma |
| title_full | Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma |
| title_fullStr | Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma |
| title_full_unstemmed | Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma |
| title_short | Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma |
| title_sort | costly hide and seek pays unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma |
| topic | cooperation prisonerʼs dilemma phase transition 87.23.Ge 89.75.Fb 89.65.-s |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/16/11/113003 |
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