Centralized and Decentralized Recycle Policy with Transboundary Pollution
In this study, under the existence of unilateral cross-border environmental pollution in two regions, a complete information dynamic game theory is constructed to discuss the environmental policy (recycling fee and treatment subsidy) formulation of the central government by two local governments. As...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2020-05-01
|
| Series: | Environments |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3298/7/5/40 |
| Summary: | In this study, under the existence of unilateral cross-border environmental pollution in two regions, a complete information dynamic game theory is constructed to discuss the environmental policy (recycling fee and treatment subsidy) formulation of the central government by two local governments. As a result, it was found that the spillover effect will reduce the level of social welfare. At the same time, the intervention of the central government and the adoption of policies tailored to local conditions will be conducive to the improvement of social welfare. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2076-3298 |