One problem, too many solutions: How costly is honest signalling of need?
The "cost of begging" is a prominent prediction of costly signalling theory, suggesting that offspring begging has to be costly in order to be honest. Seminal signalling models predict that there is a unique equilibrium cost function for the offspring that results in honest signalling and...
Main Authors: | Szabolcs Számadó, Dániel Czégel, István Zachar |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2019-01-01
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Series: | PLoS ONE |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0208443 |
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