Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier
In this essay, we intend to show that Peter Klein and Marshall Swain defeasibility theories do not resolve the Gettier problem. Klein postulates, to any Gettier counterexample, that there is a true proposition which, when associated with evidence-e of S, genuinely defeats the justification of p to S...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2010-08-01
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Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
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Online Access: | http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175/17950 |
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author | Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi |
author_facet | Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi |
author_sort | Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi |
collection | DOAJ |
description | In this essay, we intend to show that Peter Klein and Marshall Swain defeasibility theories do not resolve the Gettier problem. Klein postulates, to any Gettier counterexample, that there is a true proposition which, when associated with evidence-e of S, genuinely defeats the justification of p to S. Swain postulates that, to any Gettier-type counterexample, there is a true proposition which, when associated with the set of reasons-R of S, ultimately defeats the justification of S to believe p. To show that Klein an Swain proposals do not resolve that problem, this essay presents two Gettier-type counterexamples for which there are no genuine defeaters of justification of p by e to S and there are no defeaters not ultimately defeated of the justification of the belief of S that p by R. After doing that, we try to show that the obtained conclusion regarding Klein and Swain defeasibility theories can be extended to any defeasibility theory of knowledge. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-18T05:09:29Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-cf66b18a370448e7aa2ffb40b13f8a78 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-18T05:09:29Z |
publishDate | 2010-08-01 |
publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
record_format | Article |
series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
spelling | doaj.art-cf66b18a370448e7aa2ffb40b13f8a782022-12-21T21:19:55ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112010-08-01142175200Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de GettierEmerson Carlos ValcarenghiIn this essay, we intend to show that Peter Klein and Marshall Swain defeasibility theories do not resolve the Gettier problem. Klein postulates, to any Gettier counterexample, that there is a true proposition which, when associated with evidence-e of S, genuinely defeats the justification of p to S. Swain postulates that, to any Gettier-type counterexample, there is a true proposition which, when associated with the set of reasons-R of S, ultimately defeats the justification of S to believe p. To show that Klein an Swain proposals do not resolve that problem, this essay presents two Gettier-type counterexamples for which there are no genuine defeaters of justification of p by e to S and there are no defeaters not ultimately defeated of the justification of the belief of S that p by R. After doing that, we try to show that the obtained conclusion regarding Klein and Swain defeasibility theories can be extended to any defeasibility theory of knowledge.http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175/17950problema de gettierjustificação da crençaanulabilismo |
spellingShingle | Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology problema de gettier justificação da crença anulabilismo |
title | Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier |
title_full | Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier |
title_fullStr | Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier |
title_full_unstemmed | Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier |
title_short | Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier |
title_sort | os anulabilismos de klein e de swain e o problema de gettier |
topic | problema de gettier justificação da crença anulabilismo |
url | http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175/17950 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT emersoncarlosvalcarenghi osanulabilismosdekleinedeswaineoproblemadegettier |