Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
It has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice’s theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in aba...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2017-11-01
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Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
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Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/50687 |
_version_ | 1811327270063702016 |
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author | Patricia Marechal |
author_facet | Patricia Marechal |
author_sort | Patricia Marechal |
collection | DOAJ |
description | It has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice’s theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in abandoning the entailment from what is said to what is meant, and advancing a conception of the semantic notion of what is said that departs from speaker-hearers’ intuitions. This proposal has important consequences both concerning the evidence that should be used by philosophers of language when evaluating semantic theories, and the way we should carve up linguistic processing. |
first_indexed | 2024-04-13T15:03:46Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-cfed320ed9aa4a6bb2b04be68f1fe9af |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-04-13T15:03:46Z |
publishDate | 2017-11-01 |
publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
record_format | Article |
series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
spelling | doaj.art-cfed320ed9aa4a6bb2b04be68f1fe9af2022-12-22T02:42:13ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112017-11-0121114115310.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p14127981Minimalism and Phenomenological EvidencePatricia Marechal0Harvard UniversityIt has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice’s theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in abandoning the entailment from what is said to what is meant, and advancing a conception of the semantic notion of what is said that departs from speaker-hearers’ intuitions. This proposal has important consequences both concerning the evidence that should be used by philosophers of language when evaluating semantic theories, and the way we should carve up linguistic processing.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/50687Semanticspragmaticsminimalismsemantic perceptionlinguistic processing |
spellingShingle | Patricia Marechal Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology Semantics pragmatics minimalism semantic perception linguistic processing |
title | Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence |
title_full | Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence |
title_fullStr | Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence |
title_full_unstemmed | Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence |
title_short | Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence |
title_sort | minimalism and phenomenological evidence |
topic | Semantics pragmatics minimalism semantic perception linguistic processing |
url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/50687 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT patriciamarechal minimalismandphenomenologicalevidence |