Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence

It has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice’s theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in aba...

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Main Author: Patricia Marechal
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2017-11-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/50687
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author Patricia Marechal
author_facet Patricia Marechal
author_sort Patricia Marechal
collection DOAJ
description It has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice’s theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in abandoning the entailment from what is said to what is meant, and advancing a conception of the semantic notion of what is said that departs from speaker-hearers’ intuitions. This proposal has important consequences both concerning the evidence that should be used by philosophers of language when evaluating semantic theories, and the way we should carve up linguistic processing.
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spelling doaj.art-cfed320ed9aa4a6bb2b04be68f1fe9af2022-12-22T02:42:13ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112017-11-0121114115310.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p14127981Minimalism and Phenomenological EvidencePatricia Marechal0Harvard UniversityIt has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice’s theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in abandoning the entailment from what is said to what is meant, and advancing a conception of the semantic notion of what is said that departs from speaker-hearers’ intuitions. This proposal has important consequences both concerning the evidence that should be used by philosophers of language when evaluating semantic theories, and the way we should carve up linguistic processing.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/50687Semanticspragmaticsminimalismsemantic perceptionlinguistic processing
spellingShingle Patricia Marechal
Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Semantics
pragmatics
minimalism
semantic perception
linguistic processing
title Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
title_full Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
title_fullStr Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
title_full_unstemmed Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
title_short Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
title_sort minimalism and phenomenological evidence
topic Semantics
pragmatics
minimalism
semantic perception
linguistic processing
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/50687
work_keys_str_mv AT patriciamarechal minimalismandphenomenologicalevidence