Optimal Inter-Organization Control of Collaborative Advertising with Myopic and Far-Sighted Behaviors
This paper investigates the optimal inter-organization control of collaborative advertising considering the myopic and far-sighted behaviors. Taking a two-echelon supply chain as an example, four kinds of differential game models including myopic Stackelberg game, far-sighted Stackelberg game, myopi...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2021-08-01
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| Series: | Entropy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/23/9/1144 |
| Summary: | This paper investigates the optimal inter-organization control of collaborative advertising considering the myopic and far-sighted behaviors. Taking a two-echelon supply chain as an example, four kinds of differential game models including myopic Stackelberg game, far-sighted Stackelberg game, myopic cooperative game and far-sighted cooperative game are studied. The results show that the optimal advertising efforts of both manufacturer and retailer in the myopic situation decrease with time. But they remain constant in the far-sighted situation. The Pareto improvement applies to both game players from the non-cooperative game to the cooperative game. The numerical analyses are conducted to further investigate the theoretical results and to guide the inter-organization control of collaborative advertising in practice. |
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| ISSN: | 1099-4300 |