Kant’s transcendentalism and concept of the thing in itself
This article analyses Kant’s transcendental philosophy (transcendentalism) and its central concept — the thing in itself is the kind of concept without which it is impossible to enter Kant’s philosophy (a paraphrase of Jacobi’s maxim). Methodologically, transcendentalism implies a transcendental tur...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University
2017-12-01
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| Series: | Кантовский сборник |
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| Online Access: | https://journals.kantiana.ru/upload/iblock/266/%D0%9A%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%BA%D0%BE_68-87.pdf |
| _version_ | 1811316563758809088 |
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| author | Katrechko S. L. |
| author_facet | Katrechko S. L. |
| author_sort | Katrechko S. L. |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This article analyses Kant’s transcendental philosophy (transcendentalism) and its central concept — the thing in itself is the kind of concept without which it is impossible to enter Kant’s philosophy (a paraphrase of Jacobi’s maxim). Methodologically, transcendentalism implies a transcendental turn from studying [empirical] objects to analysing the [transcendental] conditions of their cognition. Metaphysically, Kant’s transcendentalism rests on the crucial distinction between the thing in itself and the appearance. To give a more precise definition of Kant’s thing in itself, this article considers three theses. Firstly, Kant’s thing in itself is not an object in the usual sense. It is a methodological notion rather than an actual object. There are several possible conceptualisations of Kant’s thing in itself [that use the apparatus of contemporary logic]. Secondly, the thing in itself has two modes — the empirical and noumenal ones (B306). This should be taken into account in analysing the concept of transcendentalism. Thirdly, Kant introduces the concept of the thing in itself through a negation. Being a notion of the ‘family resemblance’ type, the concept comprises three dynamically connected elements — the object in general, the transcendental object, and the noumenon (sometimes, Kant uses them interchangeably). Each element represents a phase of Reduction- Realisation (Buchdahl) in the cognition of empirical data (Kant defines such phases as thingness, using the concept of ‘transcendental object’). The data are obtained through the transcendental analysis (reflection) of the process of cognition. The thesis (2) about the dual nature of the thing in itself suggests a solution to Kant’s problem of causality. The thing in itself serves as the referent of the phenomenon, whereas the noumenal thing-in-itself (or the ‘negative noumenon) serves as its meaning (Frege’s semiotic triangle). |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T11:52:05Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-d0d607e5819a43ccbc05db5f959096f4 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0207-6918 2310-3701 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T11:52:05Z |
| publishDate | 2017-12-01 |
| publisher | Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Кантовский сборник |
| spelling | doaj.art-d0d607e5819a43ccbc05db5f959096f42022-12-22T02:48:01ZdeuImmanuel Kant Baltic Federal UniversityКантовский сборник0207-69182310-37012017-12-013646887Kant’s transcendentalism and concept of the thing in itselfKatrechko S. L. This article analyses Kant’s transcendental philosophy (transcendentalism) and its central concept — the thing in itself is the kind of concept without which it is impossible to enter Kant’s philosophy (a paraphrase of Jacobi’s maxim). Methodologically, transcendentalism implies a transcendental turn from studying [empirical] objects to analysing the [transcendental] conditions of their cognition. Metaphysically, Kant’s transcendentalism rests on the crucial distinction between the thing in itself and the appearance. To give a more precise definition of Kant’s thing in itself, this article considers three theses. Firstly, Kant’s thing in itself is not an object in the usual sense. It is a methodological notion rather than an actual object. There are several possible conceptualisations of Kant’s thing in itself [that use the apparatus of contemporary logic]. Secondly, the thing in itself has two modes — the empirical and noumenal ones (B306). This should be taken into account in analysing the concept of transcendentalism. Thirdly, Kant introduces the concept of the thing in itself through a negation. Being a notion of the ‘family resemblance’ type, the concept comprises three dynamically connected elements — the object in general, the transcendental object, and the noumenon (sometimes, Kant uses them interchangeably). Each element represents a phase of Reduction- Realisation (Buchdahl) in the cognition of empirical data (Kant defines such phases as thingness, using the concept of ‘transcendental object’). The data are obtained through the transcendental analysis (reflection) of the process of cognition. The thesis (2) about the dual nature of the thing in itself suggests a solution to Kant’s problem of causality. The thing in itself serves as the referent of the phenomenon, whereas the noumenal thing-in-itself (or the ‘negative noumenon) serves as its meaning (Frege’s semiotic triangle).https://journals.kantiana.ru/upload/iblock/266/%D0%9A%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%BA%D0%BE_68-87.pdftranscendental philosophy (transcendentalism)transcendental turnthing in itselfthing on generaltranscendental objectnoumendual causality |
| spellingShingle | Katrechko S. L. Kant’s transcendentalism and concept of the thing in itself Кантовский сборник transcendental philosophy (transcendentalism) transcendental turn thing in itself thing on general transcendental object noumen dual causality |
| title | Kant’s transcendentalism and concept of the thing in itself |
| title_full | Kant’s transcendentalism and concept of the thing in itself |
| title_fullStr | Kant’s transcendentalism and concept of the thing in itself |
| title_full_unstemmed | Kant’s transcendentalism and concept of the thing in itself |
| title_short | Kant’s transcendentalism and concept of the thing in itself |
| title_sort | kant s transcendentalism and concept of the thing in itself |
| topic | transcendental philosophy (transcendentalism) transcendental turn thing in itself thing on general transcendental object noumen dual causality |
| url | https://journals.kantiana.ru/upload/iblock/266/%D0%9A%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%BA%D0%BE_68-87.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT katrechkosl kantstranscendentalismandconceptofthethinginitself |