Incentives for Promoting Safety in the Chinese Construction Industry
Construction accidents occur frequently in China because the supervision of safety standards mandated by the government has not had its intended effect. In this paper, the authors propose a model to incentivize the management of safety during construction that involves the government as well as the...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2023-06-01
|
| Series: | Buildings |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2075-5309/13/6/1446 |
| _version_ | 1797595704819974144 |
|---|---|
| author | Qun Feng Kun Wang Yulong Feng Xuejun Shi Yilin Rao Jia Wei |
| author_facet | Qun Feng Kun Wang Yulong Feng Xuejun Shi Yilin Rao Jia Wei |
| author_sort | Qun Feng |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Construction accidents occur frequently in China because the supervision of safety standards mandated by the government has not had its intended effect. In this paper, the authors propose a model to incentivize the management of safety during construction that involves the government as well as the owners and contractors in the industry. This study analyzes the principal–agent relationship involving each participant to determine their utility function and the minimum constraints on their participation, and uses this to obtain the optimal parameters to incentivize the management of safety during construction by solving for the ones related to the contractor’s effort and reward for their performance in the proposed model of incentives. Through the design of contractor incentive parameters and owner incentive parameters to further influence the government contractor and owner tripartite safety incentive model to make the model more perfect and in line with the development status of China. This study tested the proposed model using simulations. The results indicated that increasing the cost coefficient and level of the contractor’s effort increases their expected safety-related benefits, and increasing the coefficients of reward and punishment by the government reduces the contractor’s expected safety-related benefits. Moreover, the government can motivate the management of safety during construction by offering appropriate rewards and punishments. In particular, if the government increases incentives for safety, the safety-related benefits for owners and contractors decrease in the short term but increase significantly in the long term. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T02:41:10Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-d0e8b40515b742d287932fdf049e156b |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2075-5309 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T02:41:10Z |
| publishDate | 2023-06-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Buildings |
| spelling | doaj.art-d0e8b40515b742d287932fdf049e156b2023-11-18T09:38:25ZengMDPI AGBuildings2075-53092023-06-01136144610.3390/buildings13061446Incentives for Promoting Safety in the Chinese Construction IndustryQun Feng0Kun Wang1Yulong Feng2Xuejun Shi3Yilin Rao4Jia Wei5Business School, University of Jinan, Jinan 250022, ChinaBusiness School, University of Jinan, Jinan 250022, ChinaShuifa Digital Technology Co., Ltd., Qingdao 266100, ChinaSchool of Mathematics and Statistics, Shandong Normal University, Jinan 250358, ChinaBusiness School, University of Jinan, Jinan 250022, ChinaSchool of Economics and Finance, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710061, ChinaConstruction accidents occur frequently in China because the supervision of safety standards mandated by the government has not had its intended effect. In this paper, the authors propose a model to incentivize the management of safety during construction that involves the government as well as the owners and contractors in the industry. This study analyzes the principal–agent relationship involving each participant to determine their utility function and the minimum constraints on their participation, and uses this to obtain the optimal parameters to incentivize the management of safety during construction by solving for the ones related to the contractor’s effort and reward for their performance in the proposed model of incentives. Through the design of contractor incentive parameters and owner incentive parameters to further influence the government contractor and owner tripartite safety incentive model to make the model more perfect and in line with the development status of China. This study tested the proposed model using simulations. The results indicated that increasing the cost coefficient and level of the contractor’s effort increases their expected safety-related benefits, and increasing the coefficients of reward and punishment by the government reduces the contractor’s expected safety-related benefits. Moreover, the government can motivate the management of safety during construction by offering appropriate rewards and punishments. In particular, if the government increases incentives for safety, the safety-related benefits for owners and contractors decrease in the short term but increase significantly in the long term.https://www.mdpi.com/2075-5309/13/6/1446safety managementincentive mechanismconstructionprincipal–agent relationship |
| spellingShingle | Qun Feng Kun Wang Yulong Feng Xuejun Shi Yilin Rao Jia Wei Incentives for Promoting Safety in the Chinese Construction Industry Buildings safety management incentive mechanism construction principal–agent relationship |
| title | Incentives for Promoting Safety in the Chinese Construction Industry |
| title_full | Incentives for Promoting Safety in the Chinese Construction Industry |
| title_fullStr | Incentives for Promoting Safety in the Chinese Construction Industry |
| title_full_unstemmed | Incentives for Promoting Safety in the Chinese Construction Industry |
| title_short | Incentives for Promoting Safety in the Chinese Construction Industry |
| title_sort | incentives for promoting safety in the chinese construction industry |
| topic | safety management incentive mechanism construction principal–agent relationship |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2075-5309/13/6/1446 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT qunfeng incentivesforpromotingsafetyinthechineseconstructionindustry AT kunwang incentivesforpromotingsafetyinthechineseconstructionindustry AT yulongfeng incentivesforpromotingsafetyinthechineseconstructionindustry AT xuejunshi incentivesforpromotingsafetyinthechineseconstructionindustry AT yilinrao incentivesforpromotingsafetyinthechineseconstructionindustry AT jiawei incentivesforpromotingsafetyinthechineseconstructionindustry |