Positive Freedom and Liberalism in Kant's Political Philosophy
The subject of this article is the analysis of the concept of freedom as one of the fundamental issues of political thought in Kant’s philosophy. Given Isaiah Berlin’s typology of the negative and positive conceptions of freedom in the history of philosophy, this article examines Kant’s position on...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages
2021-08-01
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| Series: | Journal of Philosophical Investigations |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_12875_0468b0f7917628596e442d660bc2f15a.pdf |
| Summary: | The subject of this article is the analysis of the concept of freedom as one of the fundamental issues of political thought in Kant’s philosophy. Given Isaiah Berlin’s typology of the negative and positive conceptions of freedom in the history of philosophy, this article examines Kant’s position on freedom in the form of the above two conceptions. In Kant’s view, moral action is a practice with a purely moral motive and respect for the moral law, without the accompaniment of human desires. There is a kind of opposition between moral inclinations and motivation in Kant’s moral theory. In Kant’s view, freedom means the abandonment of desires and the fulfillment of moral duty. In his view, inner tendencies act as internal barriers to moral action and freedom, and must be eliminated or at least controlled. The concept of freedom has a central place in Kant’s moral theory, as freedom is the product of obedience to moral duties, and this positive concept, contrary to Berlin’s claim, does not lead to tyranny. |
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| ISSN: | 2251-7960 2423-4419 |