Fodor on imagistic mental representations
Fodor’s view of the mind is thoroughly computational. This means that the basic kind of mental entity is a “discursive” mental representation and operations over this kind of mental representation have broad architectural scope, extending out to the edges of perception and the motor system. However,...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Mimesis Edizioni, Milano
2020-04-01
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| Series: | Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia |
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| Online Access: | https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2020.0004/1012 |
| _version_ | 1818326473046491136 |
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| author | Daniel C. Burnston |
| author_facet | Daniel C. Burnston |
| author_sort | Daniel C. Burnston |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Fodor’s view of the mind is thoroughly computational. This means that the basic kind of mental entity is a “discursive” mental representation and operations over this kind of mental representation have broad architectural scope, extending out to the edges of perception and the motor system. However, in multiple epochs of his work, Fodor attempted to define a functional role for non-discursive, imagistic representation. I describe and critique his two considered proposals. The first view says that images play a particular kind of functional role in certain types of deliberative tasks. The second says that images are solely restricted to the borders of perception, and act as a sort of medium for the fixing of conceptual reference. I argue, against the first proposal, that a broad-scope computationalism such as Fodor’s renders images in principle functionally redundant. I argue, against the second proposal, that empirical evidence suggests that non-discursive representations are learned through perceptual learning, and directly inform category judgments. In each case, I point out extant debates for which the arguments are relevant. The upshot is that there is motivation for limited scope computationalism, in which some, but not all, mental processes operate on discursive mental representations. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-13T12:00:56Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-d1d08c3eb0a5441e9962efbc3d5658b1 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2039-4667 2239-2629 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-13T12:00:56Z |
| publishDate | 2020-04-01 |
| publisher | Mimesis Edizioni, Milano |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia |
| spelling | doaj.art-d1d08c3eb0a5441e9962efbc3d5658b12022-12-21T23:47:07ZdeuMimesis Edizioni, MilanoRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia2039-46672239-26292020-04-01111719410.4453/rifp.2020.0004Fodor on imagistic mental representationsDaniel C. BurnstonFodor’s view of the mind is thoroughly computational. This means that the basic kind of mental entity is a “discursive” mental representation and operations over this kind of mental representation have broad architectural scope, extending out to the edges of perception and the motor system. However, in multiple epochs of his work, Fodor attempted to define a functional role for non-discursive, imagistic representation. I describe and critique his two considered proposals. The first view says that images play a particular kind of functional role in certain types of deliberative tasks. The second says that images are solely restricted to the borders of perception, and act as a sort of medium for the fixing of conceptual reference. I argue, against the first proposal, that a broad-scope computationalism such as Fodor’s renders images in principle functionally redundant. I argue, against the second proposal, that empirical evidence suggests that non-discursive representations are learned through perceptual learning, and directly inform category judgments. In each case, I point out extant debates for which the arguments are relevant. The upshot is that there is motivation for limited scope computationalism, in which some, but not all, mental processes operate on discursive mental representations.https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2020.0004/1012computational theory of mindmental representationperceptionmental imagejerry fodor |
| spellingShingle | Daniel C. Burnston Fodor on imagistic mental representations Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia computational theory of mind mental representation perception mental image jerry fodor |
| title | Fodor on imagistic mental representations |
| title_full | Fodor on imagistic mental representations |
| title_fullStr | Fodor on imagistic mental representations |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fodor on imagistic mental representations |
| title_short | Fodor on imagistic mental representations |
| title_sort | fodor on imagistic mental representations |
| topic | computational theory of mind mental representation perception mental image jerry fodor |
| url | https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2020.0004/1012 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT danielcburnston fodoronimagisticmentalrepresentations |